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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
This report is part of the research of the Policy Research Unit in Health and Social Care 
Systems and Commissioning (PRUComm) on the developing architecture of system 
management in the English NHS – including Sustainability and Transformation 
Partnerships, Integrated Care Systems or their successors – commissioned by the 
Department of Health and Social Care. 
 
Five years since the publication of the Five Year Forward View (NHS, 2014), the 
integration of health and social care at a ‘system’ level remains a central NHS policy 
priority in England. The NHS Long Term Plan (NHS, 2019a) further set out how 
organisations are to continue to work together collaboratively across bounded 
geographic territories with the aim of improving co-ordination of local health and care 
services to encourage the better use of resources and through managing population 
health. Without change to legislation, encouraging system-wide collaboration marks a 
major shift in policy direction away from the primacy of quasi-market competition.  
 
Forty-four non-statutory Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships (STPs) of NHS 
commissioners and providers, local authorities, and in some cases, voluntary and private 
sector organisations have been formed across England. Fourteen of the more ‘mature’ 
partnerships have since been designated Integrated Care Systems (ICSs) to be granted 
increased autonomy, providing greater freedom over how they manage resources 
collectively. There are usually three spatial levels of organisation within each STP/ICS: 
‘neighbourhoods’ covering a population of roughly 30,000 – 50,000; ‘place’ between 
250,000-500,000 people and STP/ICS ‘system’ level between 1 million – 3 million. In 
addition, seven new regional teams bring together NHS England and NHS Improvement 
at a regional level, intended to harmonise their operations for system-wide working.  
 
Despite undergoing continuous reinvention, an intermediate tier has existed for most of 
the history of the English NHS, with statutory authorities (at times, several layers of 
authorities) responsible variously for long-term strategic planning, allocating resources, 
acting as market umpires, and overseeing delivery of local health services. The latest 
reforms mark a return of an intermediate tier, filling a vacuum left behind by the abolition 
of Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) in 2013. However, unlike previous health 
authorities, STPs and ICSs are not statutory bodies, but instead exist as non-statutory 
voluntary partnerships despite being effectively mandated by NHS England.  
 
This report presents the findings of a review of literature on previous intermediate tiers 
in the NHS. Drawing on peer-reviewed academic research, historical analysis and 
commentary from academic and policy sources, it examines their functions and 
responsibilities, how they operated in practice and their interaction with local 
government. Putting current reforms in their geographical and historical context, we 
draw out lessons for the challenges and opportunities STPs and ICSs may encounter in 
the years ahead. 
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Summary of our findings 
Our review of literature reveals there has not been extensive, systematic research into 
intermediate tiers of the health service in England over the last seven decades. During 
this time, regions have continuously been a target for reform. There is no consensus 
among policy makers or commentators over where functions and responsibilities should 
be located. Differing views appear to have been shaped by different political strategies 
and policy trends. Organisational change has accelerated in recent years. Broadly 
speaking, operating within intractable tensions facing the health service, regions have 
progressively declined in their influence. Once responsible for the allocation of resources, 
their reduced role coincides with new forms of performance and financial management. 
Nevertheless, our review shows that longer-term strategic planning has usually occurred 
at an intermediate level. Through situating current changes in their historical and 
geographical context, a series of key themes and their implications for policy can be 
identified. 
 
Implications of the literature for current policy 
System-wide co-ordination and oversight 
There are certain benefits in an intermediate tier planning and overseeing services, as 
well as mediating centre-local relations. Previous intermediate tiers operated with 
planning functions across wider geographic areas, as well as having capacity for dispute 
resolution and managing finances. Ongoing mergers of Clinical Commissioning Groups 
(CCGs) appear to be a recognition of the benefits of co-ordinating certain functions over 
larger geographies than that of the existing CCGs, although disputes over where functions 
and responsibilities are best located will likely prove a recurrent issue. Hierarchy in the 
NHS remains strong and the ability for STPs and ICSs to provide a counter balance to 
national bodies appears weak. It is not yet clear what the role and mechanisms available 
to the new regional teams of NHS England/Improvement will be, but it is likely that they 
will act as agents of central control. Unless ICSs were to become statutory bodies with 
clear authority and stronger mechanisms to sustain agreements, given the inevitable 
conflicts embedded within the existing organisational landscape, current reforms at both 
‘system’ and ‘regional’ level do not resemble a ‘return to health authorities’, even if certain 
functions of SHAs are being recreated.  
 
Between system working and organisational autonomy 
In the absence of changes to the individual regulation of NHS organisations, system-wide 
collaboration between organisations will remain challenging. Thus, having an 
intermediate body to facilitate closer working has benefits. Yet in the absence of any 
primary legislative changes, the current policy will require STPs and ICSs to operate with 
further ‘workarounds’ to support closer working in a regulatory landscape established to 
promote competition. The complexity of governance arrangements required to 
undertake decisions across the different geographies within (and beyond) STPs/ICSs 
may well impede local service changes at the pace demanded. Partnerships will likely be 
tested by individual organisational risks, contentious decisions and response to crises. 
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Appropriate scale 
There is no ‘perfect scale’ for integrated commissioning or planning. Establishing where 
is ‘best’ also depends on the particular service or function under question. How proposed 
primary care-led models of care fit together across neighbourhood, place and system 
levels will demand careful attention. Fine-grained oversight of the delivery of local 
services such as primary and community care requires detailed local knowledge and 
strong relationships across a territory with a meaningful identity among those involved, 
including staff and the public. Yet how this intersects with the commissioning, monitoring 
and regulation of the wider geographies associated with acute and specialised sectors, 
and potentially politically contentious decisions remains unclear. It will therefore be 
particularly important to define carefully the scope, role and responsibilities of ‘places’.  
 
Place matters 
Tensions aligning national health with local government have been in existence since the 
NHS was created. These will not be resolved by the latest policies. Different attempts have 
been made over the years to align or integrate health and social care services at the 
intermediate tier. Coterminosity of boundaries may help co-ordinate health and social 
care, although NHS commissioners, Trusts, and local authorities now operate across 
different geographies. Caution must be exercised in assuming aligning boundaries and 
establishing partnership arrangements will necessarily lead to ‘integrated care’ for 
patients. Pooled budgets and co-commissioning have been increasingly used in recent 
years, however the associated political and technical difficulties are unlikely to be 
overcome under the current arrangements. STPs and ICSs will not operate uniformly 
across the country. With local government facing major financial pressures, aligning local 
priorities and decisions will be important, if challenging. Expected ‘participation’ remains 
unclear, however the role of Health and Wellbeing Boards may prove significant. How 
voluntary and private sector organisations are embedded within the new partnerships 
also remains uncertain. Health and well-being is influenced by more than health services 
alone, however, concerns policy-making is NHS-centric are by no means unprecedented. 
Both local and national politics will impact reform, not least given uncertainties over 
social care as well as questions over accountability and involvement of the public.  
 
Reform takes time 
Top-down reorganisation has been pursued at remarkable pace in recent decades. Policy 
churn is now a widely recognised phenomenon. Legislation alone does not determine 
how systems function. However, using ‘workarounds’ to circumvent existing legislation 
is problematic given the absence of political scrutiny and reflection. It takes time before 
the effects of reform become apparent, yet reorganisation now occurs without time to 
generate sufficient evidence or to learn lessons from previous failures. As debates over 
the future of the purchaser/provider split continue, policymakers should not expect the 
current changes to solve the complex challenges facing health and social care in England. 
Yet nor should urgency to reform provide sufficient justification to move onto the next 
reorganisation if expected outcomes are not achieved rapidly. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The National Health Service (NHS) was created in 1948 as a national, publicly-provided, 
healthcare system funded through general taxation to provide comprehensive care free 
at the point of need. Hospitals were nationalised whilst general practitioners became part 
of the NHS as independent contractors rather than salaried employees. The provision of 
social care was retained by local government and, unlike the NHS, needs and means-
tested. Over the last seven decades, both health and social care has undergone extensive 
reform across the four countries of the United Kingdom. In England – the primary focus 
of this review – this has been shaped by policy debates over where decisions are best 
made and by whom, how much local variation and flexibility should be possible or 
allowed, how and by whom should services be organised and provided, as well as who is 
to be held accountable for access to services and quality of care patients receive. At the 
same time, historical divides embedded at the creation of the NHS between primary and 
specialist care, health and social care (as well as mental and physical health care) 
continue to have significance more than 70 years later. With the policy aim in England for 
Sustainability and Transformation Partnership (STPs) and Integrated Care Systems 
(ICSs) to overcome these historical structural divides, it once again raises fundamental 
questions over how health and social care should be organised. 
 
An ‘intermediate tier’ shaped by central policy-making decisions whilst overseeing the 
organisation of local health services has been a feature for nearly the entire history of the 
NHS. ‘Regions’ have been a near constant – if constantly changing – feature within the 
organisation of healthcare. This differs and diverges from moves towards and away from 
regional government in England over the years. It also presents certain definitional 
challenges. Regions are spatial formations; intermediate tiers are organisational. Regions 
may be intermediate to varying degrees but intermediate tiers are not necessarily 
regional. In this report we provide a theoretical basis for understanding and explaining 
this conceptual difficulty. However, it is important to provide some initial definitional 
clarity. For consistency, we define an intermediate tier – statutory or otherwise – as a 
collective term for all layers of management or administration between the centre and the 
front line of (health) service delivery. Within the specific context of health and social care, 
we define regions as a spatial scale, or level, below national deriving its authority from 
the centre and overseeing a substantial geographical territory. 
 
For many decades, intermediate bodies, usually statutory authorities, have negotiated 
two opposing tensions within the organisation of the NHS: should the health service be 
understood as a series of local health services combined into a national system or a 
national health service that is locally managed (Butler, 1992; Mohan, 1995; Powell, 
1998)? Consequently, the intermediate tier has been under continuous reinvention, 
especially in recent decades, with their functions and responsibilities shifting as new 
policy interventions and priorities come and go. Some periods of the organisation of the 
NHS have involved multiple tiers of oversight, whilst at other times the structure has been 
relatively lean, with few layers between the ‘local’ front line of service delivery and 
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‘centre’. Joint or collaborative structural arrangements with local government have at 
different times been more or less aligned, if not integrated, over the course of multiple 
reorganisations. 
 
The NHS has historically operated with a principally hierarchical bureaucratic structure. 
Reforms in the early 1990s led to the introduction of an ‘internal market’ in the NHS that 
separated ‘purchasers’ and ‘providers’ of healthcare services and encouraged providers 
of health services to operate, take decisions and be regulated as competing business-like 
organisations. The purchaser/provider split profoundly transformed the role of regions 
in the organisation of health and care. Administrative hierarchically-organised territorial 
units with relatively coherent boundaries such as regions, areas, districts, gave way to 
more organisationally-focused and more geographically porous, if by no means detached, 
bodies such as Health Authorities and Strategic Health Authorities. Today, the English 
NHS operates as a ‘quasi-market’ with a mix of NHS and private providers (and social care 
is now provided principally by private sector providers). The Health and Social Care Act 
2012 codified and extended quasi market structures and regulation for the NHS. In this 
top-down re-organisation of 2012, it is significant to note that the statutory intermediate 
Strategic Health Authorities were abolished, leaving no statutory body between the 
national level and local purchasing organisations. 
 
Since 2014 and the publication of the Five Year Forward View (2014), ‘integration’ has 
become the prevailing policy direction for organising health and care, despite the fact that 
the Health and Social Care Act 2012 remains in force. Yet, integration and integrated care 
are malleable terms; integrated services, funding and contracts should not be assumed to 
be the same as integrated care for patients. Broadly speaking, integration is frequently 
used to describe co-ordinating care to overcome the divides between health and social 
care, primary and secondary care, and mental and physical health. In pursuing a more 
integrated service, national policy making now prioritises organisational co-operation 
through the creation of Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships (STPs) and 
Integrated Care Systems (ICSs), intended to shape how health and care is planned, co-
ordinated and delivered across England. By prioritising place-based co-operation over 
organisational competition, the emergence of ICSs raises questions as to the future of the 
competition orientated Health and Social Care Act 2012, a provider and regulatory 
landscape focused principally on organisational autonomy, whilst indicating the 
necessity for a return in some form to strategic regional or sub-regional oversight. 
 
Reasons for the changing roles of intermediate tier in the NHS are historically and 
geographically complex. Reorganisations are shaped by different policy claims over 
‘natural geographies’ of planning or organising care, where ‘best’ to locate 
responsibilities and functions, as well as changing relationships with other parts of health 
and care systems. The composition of intermediate tiers, their intended functions, where 
patients travel in order to access care and who these bodies represent has varied over 
structural reorganisations. Different functions and responsibilities shift from one level to 
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another as policy agendas and priorities have changed, even if policy narratives 
surrounding decentralisation or devolution may not necessarily have corresponded the 
reality (Allen, 2006; Lorne et al., 2019).  
 
To learn from past reorganisations analytically, rather than just descriptively, it is 
necessary to provide a theoretical basis for understanding the changing dynamics of ‘the 
region’. As a core concept in academic disciplines such as geography, the making and 
remaking of regions (at any particular spatial scale) is integral to, not just the outcome of, 
different policy interventions. Processes of region-making are contested and multiple. 
Consequently, as we have already highlighted, discussing ‘regional’ or ‘intermediate’ 
tiers, it is easy to get confused as to what is under investigation. This presents a problem 
when referring to specific ‘regional’ or ‘sub-regional’ NHS bodies at different times in its 
history (a problem also reflected within the literature).  
 
We provide a theoretical framework for the shifting dynamics of regions in the NHS in 
Section 3. For now, we simply state that the difficulty in finding consistency and stability 
around the composition and functions of regions in the NHS is not accidental.  Thus, when 
adopting a theoretical perspective, we refer to regions in their broadest conceptual sense. 
However, Figure 1 provides some consistency of terms when specifically referencing 
structures in between local and national scales in the NHS to help orientate readers. From 
an NHS-specific perspective, we use the collective term of the intermediate tier (or tiers), 
which includes ‘regional’ authorities, as just one of these tiers. Additionally, intermediate 
tiers may be statutory or non-statutory. Situated within the dynamics of centralisation 
and decentralisation, intermediate bodies may at times have greater autonomy 
(decentralist) or may operate merely as administrative layers (de-concentration). This is 
discussed more extensively in Section 3.  
 
In this report, we consider evidence about the purpose and function of previous 
intermediate tiers in the planning, co-ordination and delivery of care. It is widely-
recognised that the serial reinvention of the intermediate tier has featured heavily in the 
continuous reorganisation of the NHS in what has been described as a ‘triumph of hope 
over experience’ (Edwards, 2010). Where evidence is available, we consider how 
previous regional and system-wide planning and organisation of health services 
functioned, what issues they faced, what tools were available, and how they worked. We 
also explore how these bodies related to the long-standing challenges of joint working 
between the NHS and local government to examine collaboration in the planning and co-
ordination of health and social care, as well as the role of the voluntary and private 
sectors.  
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Our review is intended to inform policy makers and NHS colleagues dealing with the 
ongoing attempts to co-ordinate health care and also align or integrate health with social 
care. Through putting current reforms in their historical and geographic context, we 
identify key themes and challenges that those involved in ICSs and STPs may likely face. 
To achieve this, we address a series of research questions: 
 
 What functions were exercised by previous intermediate tiers of co-ordination 
in the NHS? 
 What organisational form did they take and how were they governed? 
 How have health and local authorities previously co-ordinated health and social 
care? 
 What key themes can we observe from past intermediate tiers to inform the on-
going contemporary reforms? 
 What challenges and issues might we anticipate Integrated Care Systems will 
face? 
 
  
National 
National NHS management including arm’s length bodies, central government including 
Department of Health and Social Care 
Intermediate 
tier(s) 
Collective term for 
all layers of 
management or 
administration 
between the centre 
and the front line of 
service delivery 
Regional 
Level below national, deriving its 
authority from the centre and 
overseeing a substantial geographical 
territory (which has varied in size 
over time).  
Sub-regional 
Level below regions, usually deriving 
authority from the regional tier. This 
may or may not correspond to any 
existing local government boundaries 
such as local or combined 
authorities. At times in NHS history 
there has been no regional tier above 
the sub-region. Where this is the 
case we make this clear in our 
description. 
System 
Current terminology in Long Term 
Plan usually equated with the 
boundaries of ICSs (but may equate 
to ‘place’ in smallest ICS/STPs). May 
span single or several CCGs 
 
Local 
 
Lowest organisational level where the majority of services are delivered to the 
population, including neighbourhood 
 
Figure 1 – Summary of NHS terminology 
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2. CURRENT POLICY CONTEXT 
2.1. Integration and the Five Year Forward View 
‘Integration’ is central to current national NHS policy-making in England. The 
overarching policy direction was first set out with the publication of the Five Year 
Forward View by NHS England et al. (2014) in October 2014. The change in policy 
direction came less than three years after the passing of the Health and Social Care Act 
2012 intended to further emphasise market competition between both NHS and non-NHS 
providers of healthcare. The Five Year Forward View did not provide a definition of 
integration, but broadly advocated ‘breaking down the barriers’ that were said to have 
existed since the formation of the NHS in 1948: between health and social care, between 
primary and secondary care, between mental and physical health care and between 
prevention and treatment.  
 
Several reasons were given to establish why the shift towards integrated care was 
required. Some of the forces behind a shift towards integration were identified as global 
trends: changes in the health needs of patients with longer-term conditions, as well as 
personal preferences; technological changes in treatment and the delivery of services; 
and the stated implausibility of returning to the same level of increases in healthcare 
expenditure as those of the first decade of the 21st century, as a consequence of austerity 
measures which had been chosen as the prevailing response to the global financial crisis 
(NHS, 2014). Three gaps specific to England were also identified: First, the health and 
well-being gap, i.e. if prevention were not taken seriously, health inequalities would 
widen, healthy life expectancies would stall and new treatment would not be affordable. 
Second, the care and quality gap, i.e. that if care were not redesigned, new technology 
harnessed and variations in quality and safety remedied, unavoidable variations in 
outcomes would continue and needs would be unmet. Third, the funding and efficiency 
gap, i.e. that if there were an inability to implement broad and at times controversial 
health system efficiencies, then the future NHS would experience a mixture of worse 
services, fewer staff, financial deficits and new treatments would be limited (NHS, 2014, 
p. 7). 
 
A core objective of the Five Year Forward View was to encourage local areas to establish 
pilots (known as Vanguards) which would test new ways of working together across 
sector boundaries. Crucially, these pilots were intended to establish new ‘products and 
frameworks’ which would support the wider roll-out of integrated care organisations 
comprised of multiple local service delivery organisations holding collaborative contracts 
to deliver care across sector boundaries (Checkland et al., 2019). In practice, whilst many 
integrated care initiatives were established, integrated care organisations holding 
collaborative contracts were not (Checkland et al., 2019). This has some implications for 
regional/sub-regional oversight in the future, and we will return to this in the discussion. 
 
Additionally, the Five Year Forward View set out plans for Clinical Commissioning Groups 
(CCGs) to take a greater role in primary care commissioning as part of a co-
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commissioning initiative. Clinical Commissioning Groups were able to apply to do so at 
one of three levels – from ‘greater involvement’, through ‘joint commissioning’, to 
‘delegated authority’ – with each offering increasing influence over the process, albeit 
with statutory responsibility residing with NHS England. Co-commissioning was 
launched in April 2015, but from late 2015 communications from NHS England began 
encouraging CCGs to move towards full delegated commissioning (NHS England, 2015). 
This continues to be the aspiration of NHS England on the basis that delegated 
commissioning is ‘delivering the most benefits for local populations’, and at the time of 
writing the vast majority of CCGs have taken this up (184 of 191) with only a handful 
currently operating with joint commissioning (2) or greater involvement (5) approaches 
(NHS England, no date). Research (McDermott et al., 2018) has emphasised, however, the 
extent to which current arrangements represent a ‘workaround’ of existing legislation 
and statutory duties that contains within it an unresolvable tension between conflicts of 
interest and local knowledge informing commissioning decisions, and contributes to 
ambiguity over how responsibilities for primary care performance management 
arrangements should work in practice. 
 
In 2015, the process of creating Sustainability and Transformation Plans (STPs) was 
initiated (later becoming ‘Partnerships’). NHS England et al. (2015, p. 4) issued guidance 
that stressed moves towards place-based planning processes would involve ‘local leaders 
coming together as a team, developing a shared vision with the local community, which 
also involves local government as appropriate; [and] programming a coherent set of 
activities to make it happen’. 209 CCGs, as well as local authorities and NHS providers, 
were directed by national NHS bodies to work together to establish the ‘geographic scope 
of their STP’ constituting their ‘transformation footprint’ for the period between October 
2016 and March 2021. Building on initial pilots fostering moves towards integrated care, 
the vision for STPs was they would bring together NHS and other organisations into 
integrated, collaborative partnerships. Thus planning guidance entitled Delivering the 
Forward View: NHS planning guidance 2016/17 – 2020/21 (NHS, 2015, p. 4) was issued to 
every NHS provider and commissioning body stating that: 
 
We are asking every health and care system to come together, to create its 
own ambitious local blueprint for accelerating its implementation of the 
Forward View … Planning by individual institutions will increasingly be 
supplemented with planning by place for local populations … As a truly place-
based plan, the STPs must cover all areas of CCG and NHS England 
commissioned activity … The STP must also cover better integration with local 
authority services. 
   
Organisations were initially given one month to produce their STPs, on the basis that ‘we 
don’t have the luxury of waiting until perfect plans are completed’ (NHS, 2015, p. 3). 
Despite the time pressures imposed, national guidance emphasised STPs were to be local 
plans, rather than a top-down reorganisation: 
12 
 
 
‘Transformation footprints should be locally defined, based on natural 
communities, existing working relationships, patient flows and take account 
of the scale needed to deliver services, transformation and public health 
programmes required… In future years we will be open to simplifying some of 
these arrangements. Where geographies are already involved in the Success 
Regime, or devolution bids, we would expect these to determine the 
transformation footprint. Although it is important to get this right, there is no 
single right answer. The footprints may well adapt over time’ (NHS, 2015, p. 
6). 
 
By March 2016, 44 bounded STPs were created and mapped across England, covering an 
average population size of 1.2 million (NHS England, 2016). STP leaders were drawn from 
NHS organisations, with the exception of 4 who were from local authorities. The new STPs 
had no statutory basis and all existing organisational accountabilities remained. National 
submission of STP documentation covering the period between October 2016 and March 
2021 was required in order to enable their allocation of a portion of the Sustainability 
and Transformation Fund that in 2016/7 amounted to £2.1 billion (Hammond et al., 
2017).  
 
Importantly, no legislative changes were made in connection with the STP process. The 
existing organisational landscape and regulatory framework orientated towards 
organisational competition and individual organisational regulation and monitoring 
continued to exist, despite the shift towards system-wide working. The formative stages 
of the creation of STPs was also politically problematic given the public were largely 
excluded from involvement in the rapid production of the plans (Black and Mays, 2016) 
and several local authorities raised concerns with or disassociated themselves from their 
constitutive STPs (HSJ, 2017, 2018).   
 
By 2017, when STPs formally became Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships, 
some parts of the country were already enacting further changes.  The most high-profile 
and wide-ranging of these was Greater Manchester. In February 2015, it was announced 
that a health and social care devolution deal had been agreed between NHS England and 
the 12 Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) and 10 local authorities in the city-region 
of Greater Manchester (NHS, 2015). Their new partnership arrangements were, 
effectively, a front-runner to the 44 STPs. They also became one of the 14 most ‘advanced’ 
STPs that have subsequently evolved into Integrated Care Systems (ICSs).  
 
ICSs are the principal motivator of this review, for which we now turn to provide 
definition. For the purposes of clarity, it is useful to state that STPs were the forerunners 
to ICSs, and there is an expectation from NHS England that all STPs will have evolved into 
ICSs by 2021. However, many STPs in England have yet to be redesignated ICSs, and we 
recognise that there is currently a degree of ambiguity between these terms.  
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2.2. Definition and evolution of Integrated Care Systems 
Unlike previous reforms, led by the Department of Health, current national policy 
priorities have been driven by arm’s length bodies, principally NHS England (legally, NHS 
Commissioning Board) working with others such as NHS Improvement, albeit under the 
badge of ‘the NHS’. Formal definition of ICSs (or STPs) has not been set out in legislation, 
but evolved over time in policy documents published by NHS England. As discussed 
above, ICSs emerged out of a series of policy documents and announcements since the 
initial creation of STPs. How they are expected to work in practice is still evolving, 
although NHS England state that they expect all parts of England to be covered by an ICS 
by April 2021. Importantly, although the development of ICSs (and STPs) have been 
effectively mandated by NHS England, they are not statutory bodies. Existing 
organisational accountabilities and forms remain and individual organisations can 
withdraw from the new partnerships at any time.   
 
The Next Steps on the NHS Five Year Forward View (2017) published in March 2017 stated 
that the more ‘advanced’ STPs would go further in a move to more fully integrating their 
services and funding in what were called at the time Accountable Care Systems (ACSs).  
ACSs were positioned as an evolution of existing STPs – ‘or groups of organisations within 
an STP sub-area’ – whereby systems of NHS commissioners and providers, often working 
together with local authorities, will opt to take collective responsibility for both resources 
and the population health of their territory (NHS, 2017, p. 36). In doing so, they will be 
granted greater controls over how they operate their local system.  
 
The NHS Long Term Plan  (NHS, 2019a) published in January 2019 continued to 
emphasise the move towards integrated partnerships prioritising collaboration over 
competition. It states that ICSs (as ACSs had been renamed) ‘bring together local 
organisations in a pragmatic and practical way to deliver the ‘triple integration’ of 
primary and specialist care, physical and mental health services, and health with social 
care’ (NHS, 2019a, p. 29). ICSs are intended to be ‘bottom-up’ partnership arrangements, 
rather than following a single national blueprint and there are currently no extensive, 
fixed set of requirements to which all ICSs must adhere. The current STPs and ICSs vary 
considerably in population size and organisational complexity. However, broadly 
speaking, the new ‘system-level’ ICS or STP (population size of 1-3 million) sits in a 
hierarchy with ‘place’ level (population size of 250, 000 – 500,000, usually local authority 
areas) and ‘neighbourhood’ level (population size of 35,000-50,000) beneath it and 
‘regional’ level above through the regional arms of NHS England and NHS Improvement 
(discussed further below).   
 
Local authorities have a key role in working at ‘place’ level through ICS structures 
whereby ‘commissioners will make shared decisions with providers on population 
health, service redesign and Long Term Plan implementation’ (NHS, 2019a, p. 10). Recent 
NHS policy guidance on Designing integrated care systems (ICSs) in England sets out the 
‘place’ level as covering a population of roughly 250,000 – 500,000, ‘served by a set of 
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health and care providers in a town or district, connecting primary care networks to 
broader services including those provided by local councils, community hospitals or 
voluntary organisations’ (NHS, 2019b). The ‘place’ level was anticipated to be the spatial 
scale through which Accountable (or Integrated) Care Organisations were to exist, 
however, they do not currently exist (see figure 2 below).  
 
Level Function Priorities 
Neighbourhood 
(c. 30,000 to 
50,000 people) 
 Integrated multi-disciplinary teams  
 Strengthened primary care through 
primary care networks – working across 
practices and health and social care 
 Proactive role in population heath and 
prevention 
 Services (e.g. social prescribing) drawing 
on resource across community, 
voluntary and independent sector, as 
well as other public services (e.g. 
housing teams). 
 Integrate primary and community services  
 Implement integrated care models  
 Embed and use population health 
management approaches 
 Roll out primary care networks with 
expanded neighbourhood teams  
 Embed primary care network contract and 
shared savings scheme  
 Appoint named accountable clinical director 
of each network 
Place 
(c. 250,000 – 
500,000 people) 
 Typically council/borough level  
 Integration of hospital, council and 
primary care teams / services  
 Develop new provider models for 
‘anticipatory’ care 
 Models for out-of-hospital care around 
specialties  and for hospital discharge 
and admission avoidance 
 Closer working with local government and 
voluntary sector partners on prevention and 
health inequalities  
 Primary care network leadership to form 
part of provider alliances or other 
collaborative arrangements  
 Implement integrated care models  
 Embed population health management 
approaches  
 Deliver Long-Term Plan commitments on 
care delivery and redesign  
 Implement Enhanced Health in Care Homes 
(EHCH) model 
System 
(c. 1 million to 3 
million people) 
 System strategy and planning  
 Develop governance and accountability 
arrangements across system  
 Implement strategic change  
 Manage performance and collective 
financial resources  
 Identify and share best practice across 
the system, to reduce unwarranted 
variation in care and outcomes 
 Streamline commissioning arrangements, 
with CCGs to become leaner, more strategic 
organisations (typically one CCG for each 
system) 
 Collaboration between acute providers and 
the development of group models  
 Appoint partnership board and independent 
chair  
 Develop sufficient clinical and managerial 
capacity  
 
NHS England and 
NHS Improvement 
(regional) 
 Agree system objectives  
 Hold systems to account 
 Support system development 
 Improvement and, where required, 
intervention 
 Increased autonomy to systems  
 Revised oversight and assurance model  
 Regional directors to agree system-wide 
objectives with systems  
 Bespoke development plan for each STP to 
support achievement of ICS status 
NHS England and 
NHS Improvement 
(national) 
 Continue to provide policy position and national strategy  
 Develop and deliver practical support to systems, through regional teams  
 Continue to drive national programmes e.g. Getting It Right First Time (GIRFT) 
 Provide support to regions as they develop system transformation teams 
 
Figure 2 – Reproduction of spatial scales and functions of NHS Long Term Plan (NHS, 2019a: 3)  
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Integrated Care Systems are intended to focus on shared decision-making with providers 
about the allocation of resources, service design and improving population health, 
although under existing legislation, any procurement or awarding of contracts must be 
undertaken by NHS commissioners. Recent guidance published by NHS England (NHS, 
2019b, p. 3) sets out the functions of ICSs as follows: to develop system strategy and 
planning; to develop system-wide governance and accountability arrangements; to lead 
the implementation of strategic change; to manage performance and collective financial 
resources; and to identify and spread best practices across the system to reduce 
unwarranted variation in care and outcomes.  The governance of ICSs as set out in the 
Long Term Plan (NHS, 2019a, p. 30) should include: 
 
 ‘a partnership board, drawn from and representing commissioners, trusts, 
primary care networks, and – with the clear expectation that they will wish to 
participate – local authorities, the voluntary and community sector and other 
partners; 
 a non-executive chair (locally appointed, but subject to approval by NHS England 
and NHS Improvement) and arrangements for involving non-executive members 
of boards/governing bodies; 
 sufficient clinical and management capacity drawn from across their constituent 
organisations to enable them to implement agreed system-wide changes; 
 full engagement with primary care, including through a named accountable 
Clinical Director of each primary care network; 
 a greater emphasis by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) on partnership working 
and system-wide quality in its regulatory activity, so that providers are held to 
account for what they are doing to improve quality across their local area; 
 all providers within an ICS will be required to contribute to ICS goals and 
performance, backed up by a) potential new licence conditions (subject to 
consultation) supporting NHS providers to take responsibility, with system 
partners, for wider objectives in relation to use of NHS resources and population 
health; and b) longer-term NHS contracts with all providers, that include clear 
requirements to collaborate in support of system objectives; 
 clinical leadership aligned around ICSs to create clear accountability to the ICS. 
Cancer Alliances will be made coterminous with one or more ICS, as will Clinical 
Senates and other clinical advisory bodies. ICSs and Health and Wellbeing Boards 
will also work closely together’.  
 
The existing CCGs are required to become streamlined and strategic, which ‘typically’ will 
require moving towards mergers that lead to a single CCG covering each ICS in order to 
‘enable a single set of commissioning decisions at system level’ (NHS, 2019a, p. 29),  
although many of the ‘frontrunner’ ICSs feature more than one CCG (for instance, as one 
of the biggest ICSs, Greater Manchester continues to have ten CCGs working with the 10 
16 
 
largely coterminous local authorities, despite their new ICS-wide partnerships 
arrangements (Walshe et al., 2018)).  
 
Seven new regional teams led by regional directors as part of the new NHS Executive 
Group, were announced in December 2018 (NHS England, 2018b). The new teams are 
regional arms of an amalgamation of NHS England and NHS Improvement.3 Their role is 
currently loosely defined as working to ‘support local systems to provide more joined up 
and sustainable care for patients’ (NHS England, 2019a: np). The regional teams are 
‘responsible for the quality, financial and operational performance of all NHS 
organisations in their region, drawing on the expertise and support of our corporate 
teams to improve services for patients and support local transformation’ and they are 
also tasked with supporting the development and identity formation of the STPs and ICSs 
(NHS England, 2019a: np). At the time of writing, these roles are still evolving.   
 
In addition, there have been simultaneous policy developments aimed at encouraging 
groups of organisations merging to become larger integrated care organisations which 
would be contracted with the NHS through the Integrated Care Provider (ICP) contract 
(previously known as the Accountable Care Organisation contract) developed by NHS 
England (NHS England, 2018a). NHS England guidance (NHS, 2019b) suggests ICSs will 
in general operate over a larger population than any single provider, ICP or otherwise. 
There has been no indication nationally that this will happen everywhere in England and 
initial attempts to roll out ICP contracts have been delayed, following judicial reviews and 
public consulations. At the time of writing, no ICP contract has been agreed. To allay 
concerns that for profit firms might wish to form ICPs, a recent Commons Health and 
Social Care Committee (2019) report advised that the ability for an ICP contract to be held 
by a non-statutory body should be ruled out and NHS England has confirmed that only 
NHS owned ICPs would curently be approved (HSJ, 2019). 
 
2.3. Primary Care Networks 
Important organisational changes are also currently taking place at other spatial scales 
that will impact system-wide planning, organising and oversight of local services. At a 
neighbourhood level has been the formation of Primary Care Networks (PCNs). 
Introduced in the NHS Long Term Plan (NHS, 2019a),  but building on an aspiration for 
greater ‘at scale’ working in primary care established in the Five Year Forward View (NHS, 
2014), PCNs involve groups of GP practices (typically covering patient populations of 
30,000-50,000, with approximately 1,300 PCNs in England in total) agreeing to work 
more closely with each other, as well as attempting to integrate better with community  
health care services and other local health and care organisations. The intended benefits 
of PCNs include: providing more accessible and integrated care for patients, reducing 
                                                             
3 In the absence of any legislative change, a merger between the NHS Commissioning Board and NHS 
Improvement (itself an informal amalgamation of Monitor and NHS Trust Development Agency) is not 
legally possible at present. 
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pressures on the primary care workforce, providing footprints for integrated community-
based teams, and more proactive assessment of the health needs of local populations and 
the development of tailored interventions to address these. In terms of scale, NHS 
England state that PCNs must be ’small enough to provide the personal care valued by 
both patients and GPs, but large enough to have impact and economies of scale through 
better collaboration between practices and others in the local health and social care 
system’ (NHS England, 2019b). They are expected to be geographically contiguous and 
reside within CCG and ICS boundaries. Each PCN must employ a Clinical Director to 
represent the interests of his/her network at the ICS level and communicate information 
from one to the other. 
 
The decision of whether to join a PCN is voluntary for a GP practice but the incentives to 
do so are strong and the vast majority decided to do so by the 1st July 2019 deadline. This 
involved each practice signing up to a Network Contract (a Directed Enhanced Service, an 
extension to the GP contract), which will provide an opportunity to attract £1.8bn of 
funding to general practice over five years. Some of this funding will relate to the 
achievement of certain requirements associated with seven service specifications set out 
in the Network Contract, which will evolve annually. From 2020/21, PCNs will be 
required to demonstrate achievements relating to five of these (e.g. structured medicines 
review and optimisation; enhanced care in care homes), with the final two introduced 
from 2021/22 (cardiovascular disease prevention and diagnosis; and tackling 
neighbourhood inequalities). To support PCNs to deliver the service specifications, and 
with an expectation of alleviating some GP workforce pressures, an Additional Roles 
Reimbursement Scheme (ARRS) has been introduced, which will see Networks receive 
the majority of funding (staggered by year according to role) to employ clinical 
pharmacists (2019), social prescribing link workers (2019), physician associates (2020), 
first contact physiotherapists (2020) and first contact paramedics (2021).  
 
Research into PCNs is currently underway led by other members of the Policy Research 
Unit in Health and Social Care Systems and Commissioning (PRUComm). Therefore, 
whilst links are noted here, their development is analysed in depth elsewhere. 
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3. THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
Although the ‘region’ is a widely used term in health policy and health systems research, 
as well as popular vocabulary more broadly, it is seldom conceptualised. The under-
theorisation of regions within health and social care systems literatures is closely related 
to well-recognised issues with decentralisation, risking becoming a ‘empty concept’ due 
the lack of conceptual clarity (cf. Peckham, 2016), suffering from ‘terminological 
obfuscation’ (Greener et al., 2009). How we conceptualise regions has implications for 
how we can learn from past research into regions in the NHS as well as how we might 
anticipate likely challenges that current reforms will potentially face. Therefore, before 
turning to outline our analytical framework for this review, it is important to first situate 
regions within the relevant wider theoretical literature. 
 
3.1. Conceptualising the region 
What is a region? And why does it matter? Regions can be assumed to hold obvious 
meaning, as a geographic context or bounded container for a particular policy 
intervention, for instance, or the location for a set of institutions and the populations that 
they represent or for which they have responsibility. Regionalisation can be positioned 
within cyclical trends of localism and centralisation, closely associated to processes of 
decentralisation and/or devolution evoking the notion of the shifting of powers, 
resources and responsibilities down from national to sub-national spatial scales or away 
from ‘the centre’ (De Vries, 2000). And yet, the region can be used variously to refer to 
local, sub-national or supra-national scales, according to the particular phenomena under 
investigation. Moreover, in recent decades, the delivery of health and care systems have 
increasingly involved of a broader range of private and voluntary agencies and 
organisations such that the ‘regional’ tier of organisation no longer strictly relates to a 
single public health authority in a neat state hierarchy. Thus, networked, ‘horizontal’ 
relationships can also become an important dimension within the organisation and 
provision of public services including in healthcare (Exworthy and Powell, 2004) in the 
shadow of hierarchy. This raises questions of who is involved in the making of regions 
and to what effect. Defining ‘regional spaces’, then, is far from straightforward and can 
vary over time (Jones, 2010). This presents a challenge when looking to the past to 
anticipate contemporary challenges. 
 
As a central concept to academic disciplines such as geography and political science, how 
regions (at any particular spatial scale) are conceptualised is highly contested and the 
subject of extensive debate (Jones, 2010; Cochrane, 2018). We do not elaborate 
substantively on these debates here. Rather we simply observe that struggles over 
regional spaces have profound impact on how they are governed and function, spanning 
a range of inter-connected areas such as uneven economic development, the political and 
administrative territorial organisation of public services and the forging of particular, 
often contested, identities. Crucially, for the purposes of our review, the challenge in 
articulating or agreeing how a region is conceptualised and delineated is not merely a 
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question of population size or descriptive terminology but integral to how regions are 
made and re-made over time. 
 
Put simply, regions are ‘social constructs that are created in political, economic, cultural 
and administrative practices and discourses’ (Paasi, 2000, p. 6). They are spatial 
formations that are produced through a multitude of social processes, rather than 
existing as a reified backdrop to social action. Accordingly, we may understand a region 
as:  
‘a temporary permanence, something held stable, though not fixed and 
absolute, at different points in time, for different purposes. There is, then, no 
single reading of a region. Regions are multiple entities and we should look at 
the process and practices of region-making historically and spatially’ (Jones, 
2010, p. 1).  
 
As the above quote emphasises, analytical attention should be given to processes of 
region-making. If we recognise regions are ‘forged historically through political and 
policy struggles involving state and nonstate forces’ (Jones, 2010, p. 1), historically-
sensitive accounts are crucial for understanding the changing geographies of regions, 
including for the co-ordination of health and social care. Consequently, for our review it 
is important to observe: 
 
‘There is no ‘objective’ or purely technical definition of the region or the ‘right’ 
spatial level at which to conduct particular policies or regulate economic, 
social and environmental systems. Instead, different conceptualizations of the 
region have developed across time and in different places, and have competed 
with each other’ (Keating, 2017, p. 2). 
 
To understand where the latest turn towards integrated care systems comes from, it is 
important to examine the impact of past waves of administrative reorganisation 
displaying elements of both change and continuity, materially, institutionally and 
rhetorically in the NHS and local government (Powell, 2018). In other words, it is 
necessary ‘to go back’ before we can move ‘forward’ (Thrift, 1994). 
 
The re-making of regions in health and social care occurs across different geographical 
scales and sites at different points in time within different governance frames. The 
continuous re-invention of intermediate tiers between local and national in co-ordination 
of health and social care is produced through dynamic spatial processes and practices of 
‘institutionalization’ that remake regions unevenly (Paasi, 1986). Rather than a neat 
temporal layering of a fixed or rigid set of new regional reforms over the previous round 
of reform, elements of past reforms continue to endure and influence contemporary 
institutional arrangements, whilst other elements are removed (Coleman et al., 2010). 
Thus, the shifting of powers across and through sub-national spaces – for which we can 
include the role of intermediate tiers in the NHS – ‘never entails the creation of a ‘blank 
slate’ on which totally new scalar arrangements could be established, but occurs through 
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a conflictual ‘layering’ process in which emergent rescaling strategies collide with, and 
only partially rework inherited landscapes of state scalar organization’ (Brenner, 2009).  
 
Policy-making processes relating to the spatial re-structuring of health and social care 
are mediated by different national, regional and local actors and their interactions, 
variously and unevenly shape processes of change and subsequent outcomes. In this 
sense, we must be sensitive to how reforms are ‘a matter of micro-political struggle, as 
well as reflecting wider, more ‘structural’ imperatives’ (Peck, 2001, p. 451). Analysis must 
therefore take into consideration how the construction of particular policy problems get 
articulated by policy makers, politicians and other actors steering and struggling with the 
reform of health and social care. As Lindblom (1968, p. 13) denotes, ‘[p]olicy makers are 
not faced with a given problem. Instead they have to identify and formulate their 
problem’. Thus, for our purposes here, this requires paying attention to how the 
construction of regions are embodied with particular contested meanings and claims that 
shift over time. 
 
It is helpful to illustrate this point with a brief example. As we discuss in detail in Sections 
4.2 – 4.4 below, Regional Health Authorities (RHAs) were a constant organisational feature 
in the NHS between 1974 until 1994/6. During this time, regional authorities spanned 
more-or-less similar geographical territories. Yet their roles, functions and workings 
altered substantively as relationships with local and national organisations changed. 
Thus, despite enduring several reforms, the changing ‘composition’ of how the regions 
were governed was shaped by wider political strategies, changes in personnel, alterations 
to resource allocation formula, the growing influence of general management, changing 
medical and care practices, wider social and demographic shifts and changing legislation, 
most significantly through the introduction of the purchaser/provider split. Therefore, if 
delimiting Regional Health Authorities on a map of England, regions appear more or less 
static, covering similar geographic territories over several decades, operating at the same 
spatial scale between local and national levels. However, as we have already established, 
regions are socially produced, continuously under negotiation, and therefore analytical 
and empirical focus must be on the terms through which regional spaces are made and 
re-made. RHAs, following our example here, were radically transformed in how they 
functioned and interacted with local and national scales throughout this period.    
 
Through appreciating these dynamics, it is not possible to directly compare 
contemporary integrated care systems ‘like-for-like’ with previous intermediate tiers in 
the NHS. As Section 4 illustrates, the continuous reinvention of regions at different scales 
within health and social care roll-forward out of the real or perceived failures of previous 
reforms, with certain organisational legacies and relationships enduring, whilst other 
aspects are variously re-shuffled, recreated or removed. Learning from the past research 
into intermediate tiers in the organisation of the NHS and its connections with local 
government requires situating the development of integrated care systems within their 
geographical and historical context. It is through doing so that we can draw out key 
themes to help anticipate issues within the current reforms, the focus of Section 5. 
Additionally, due to the central funding of the NHS, regions take a particular 
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organisational form that leads to certain limits regarding decentralisation. Consequently, 
despite recent devolution initiatives (discussed more later), we cannot view the NHS as 
having political devolution, for example. Statutory duties are set centrally and thus 
powers are likely to be executive rather than supported politically. Power is devolved 
from the centre yet remains accountable to the centre, and thus can be distinguished from 
devolved political power. As we elaborate later, this is also the root of the many tensions 
between local government and the NHS. 
 
3.2. Analytical framework 
We now set out our analytical framework situating the current development of integrated 
care systems within the geographical and historical context of previous reorganisations. 
To understand the changing construction of intermediate tiers, we must be necessarily 
selective in our focus, given timescales covered and the extent of issues associated to the 
co-ordination of health and care. In making this move, we echo Atkinson (2007), who 
observes that any approach to studying decentralisation within health systems research 
is necessarily partial, due to the range and complexity of processes involved rendering 
in-depth analysis in all areas impossible. Our analytical framework for understanding 
regions in health and social care combine three main elements. These are as follows:  
 
 Processes of re-scaling between national and sub-national spatial scales – 
the interplay of shifting powers, resources and responsibilities across and 
between spatial scales 
 The changing ‘composition’ of the regional co-ordination of health and care 
– the shifting dynamics of regions shaped by bureaucratic hierarchy, markets and 
partnerships 
 The discursive construction of regions within the formulation of policy 
problems/solutions – how regions are talked about and shaped by claims made 
about what interventions are intended to achieve. Often connected to particular 
spatial imaginaries such as ‘empowering the front-line’ or ‘natural geographies’ of 
care. 
 
Firstly, since the 1970s, devolution of powers, resources and responsibilities from 
national to sub-national scales such as regions and localities has been an overarching 
global trend (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). The concepts of ‘devolution’ and 
‘decentralisation’ are contested terms and care is required to outline the specific aspects 
of re-scaling processes (MacKinnon, 2015). Broadly speaking, 
devolution/decentralisation refers to the political, economic and social processes 
through which different functions are shifted between different spatial scales, the 
interactions between these scales, and how tensions between them are continuously 
negotiated. As a form of state re-structuring, devolution/decentralisation corresponds 
with the capacity of particular political or administrative levels to take decisions and the 
constraints placed upon them through the multi-faceted tensions associated with 
centralisation-decentralisation.  
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As noted, the ‘terminological obfuscation’ surrounding decentralisation is so frequent in 
policy that it can be hard to assess whether the intended aims of the latest reform have 
or have not been achieved (Greener et al., 2009). Health systems literatures frequently 
cite Rondinelli’s (1981) typology of decentralisation as a sliding scale from the least to 
most de-centralised, namely: de-concentration; delegation; devolution; and privatisation 
and/or the transfer of power to non-state organisations. Bossert’s (1998) theorisation of 
‘decision space’ has been used to explore the extent to which local autonomy is available 
in a range of areas of relevance to health and social care systems, such as finances, service 
organisation, human resources and rules of governance (Exworthy and Frosini, 2008; 
Checkland, Dam, et al., 2018). In seeking to address the multi-directional complexities of 
reorganisations across spatial scales, Peckham et al. (2005) developed the Arrow’s 
Framework, sensitive to the simultaneity of decentralisation and centralisation across 
different issues/areas. Their work illustrates that the decentralisation of power does not 
just shift from one scale to another or always in the same direction (i.e. national, to 
regional, to local). This is helpful for identifying the extent of decentralisation taking 
place. Whilst rhetoric accompanying many reorganisations suggests an appetite for 
decentralisation, in practice this has historically been limited in scope (Peckham et al., 
2005).  
 
Broadly speaking, rescaling is neither unidirectional nor zero-sum (Cox, 2009). For our 
purposes here, we emphasise the significance of the interplay of power relations across 
scales, between regions within local and national scales and their different organisations. 
Regions (at any particular scale) are constituted through their inter-relations with other 
spatial scales (Lorne et al., 2019). In other words, there is a need to make clear what 
resources, responsibilities and powers sit at what particular spatial scale and with whom, 
but also to understand the qualitative changing relations as these different spatial scales 
and their changing organisational bodies, intersect, and sit in tension. 
 
Second, the shifting composition of regional co-ordination between hierarchies, markets 
and partnerships relates to the changing forms and mechanisms through which public 
services are organised, regulated and monitored. Where we can observe notable 
changing levers, mechanisms and approaches in how health services are organised over 
recent decades, emphasis is placed on the function of ‘regional’ bodies within the 
sedimented overlaying of modes of co-ordination over time. This is closely associated 
with the growing complexity of co-ordinating service provision. Although the NHS is 
conventionally presented as having experienced relatively neatly defined paradigm shifts 
from bureaucratic hierarchies to more market and then partnership-based modes of co-
ordination, such characterisation has been deemed overly simplistic (e.g. Exworthy, 
Powell and Mohan, 1999). Instead, Exworthy, Powell and Mohan (1999, p. 15) argue that 
it is more accurate to examine waves of NHS reform in terms of a ‘changing mix between 
quasi-hierarchies, quasi-markets and quasi-networks’. As we discuss later, hierarchies 
continue to endure in the English NHS (Osipovic et al., 2019). Therefore, combined with 
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analytical understanding of the spatial dimensions of the governing of regions (Lorne et 
al., 2019), our framework pays attention to the shifting composition of the modes of co-
ordination and the impacts of historical changes on subsequent reorganisations of 
regions. 
 
Third, we seek to highlight the positioning of regions in the formulation of policy 
problems/solutions and the geography of discourse. The increasing rate of structural 
reorganisation is a well-recognised phenomenon in the literature on the NHS, particularly 
with regards to the regional or sub-regional bodies (Edwards, 2010). For example, health 
systems research adopting historical perspectives has observed that: ‘Some solutions 
such as market-based reform have flowed and ebbed over the years, and the ‘solution’ of 
structural reorganisation in one year has become the ‘problem’ in a future year’ (Powell, 
2018). To supplement our above focus on re-scaling and the changing governance of 
health systems, it is necessary to explore how policy makers rhetorically position regions 
within this changing landscape. 
 
Sense-making and meaning-making are integral to the making and implementing of 
policy. Where policy is discursively mediated, conditioned by particular claims, this third 
aspect pays attention to how the real or perceived failures of previous policy reforms go 
on to shape subsequent reforms, such that the way in which policy ‘problems’ are 
identified and constructed shapes how policy ‘solutions’ are subsequently formulated 
(Sum and Jessop, 2013). Theoretical approaches within cultural political economy 
exploring regional economic development can support how we understand regions 
within the organisation of the NHS and how their remaking has been shaped by policy 
problem and solution formation. To elaborate: 
 
“A pendulum swing effect has been experienced, whereby UK state strategy, 
in turn linked to how the policy problem is constructed and its solution 
articulated, has moved and oscillated between national, regional, and local 
patterns of state projects and modes of state interventions. The previous 
round of state spatial restructuring has been used as the explanation for state 
intervention failure, with the next round seeking to address this through 
developing spatial horizons, also failing in turn”.  
(Jones, 2019, pp. 29–30, original emphasis). 
 
The discursives aspect of policy-making complements focus on re-scaling and changing 
governance to provide a fuller account of how previous reorganisations shape 
subsequent changes. In the current context, we shall discuss how this is helpful in 
understanding a rhetorical shift away from market competition in the absence of 
legislative change, and connectedly, the recreation of intermediate tiers of ‘system-wide’ 
co-ordination.  
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3.3. Challenges with terminology 
As we stated in the Introduction, defining and analysing ‘regional’ and ‘sub regional’ units 
of analysis in the NHS is not straightforward. In literature on the (English) NHS, there is 
a frequent conflation or terminological imprecision in the spatial vocabulary of terms, 
sometimes equating ‘regional’ or ‘local’ to describe ‘local level priority setters’ of the 
‘meso’ level (Smith, Mitton and Davidson, 2014) or ‘periphery’ and ‘field’. Different terms 
have been adopted to describe the spatial co-ordination of health and care, such as ‘local 
health economies’ (Exworthy and Frosini, 2008), ‘health geography’ (NHS, 2015), ‘place’ 
(Hammond et al., 2017), ‘regional place-based’ systems (Checkland, Dam, et al., 2018), 
‘geographical footprints’ and ‘local health systems’ (Alderwick and Ham, 2016), as just a 
few more recent examples.  
 
Likewise, local government has experienced significant changes  since the creation of the 
post-war welfare state (Cochrane, 1993) including contentious boundary 
reconfigurations, albeit organised around more obviously place-based geographies 
including district, borough and county councils, combined authorities and regional 
government (even if their current activities increasingly reach beyond those 
administrative boundaries). In the most immediate sense for co-ordination between 
health and social care, these different geographies present technical challenges 
associated with the differences between local census-based population and the GP 
registered patient-list. More broadly, it reflects the growing complexities and accelerated 
churn of reorganisations. 
 
It is important to recognise that different NHS organisations (particularly following the 
purchaser/provider split), local authorities, private providers, patients and the public 
more broadly have very different relationships with regions and places. This can include 
patient and financial flows, electoral boundaries, and multiple identities shaped by 
spatial, organisational and professional histories and politics (Hammond et al., 2017; 
Lorne et al., 2019). In the similar way that the accounts in the literature of the ‘centre’ not 
consistently referring to a single site, whether in the organisation of the NHS (Ham, 1981; 
Locock and Dopson, 2007) or central government more broadly (Rhodes, 1988), defining 
what is understood by regions is difficult and varied. 
 
It is therefore no coincidence that it is difficult to find a consistent spatial terminology to 
pin-down the intermediate levels that sit between the local and national amidst the 
accelerated churn of NHS and local government re-organisation. For instance, the role of 
regions within the ‘spatial selectivity’ of state strategies becomes apparent in Section 4 
illustrating how policy interventions are inscribed with particular intentions, targeting 
different geographic scales or spaces in attempts to implement certain policy agendas 
(Jones, 1997). Different claims to the ‘natural geographies’ within which health and care 
should be organised exist at different points in time, alongside different combinations of 
governing mechanisms and organisational arrangements deemed appropriate to achieve 
such strategies. Thus, there is no consistent intermediate tier within the NHS over its 
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seven decades. Rather regions have been the target for successive reforms, shaped by a 
mixture of enduring and changing relationships with local and national government and 
other bodies whilst being subject to fluctuating policy agendas. In short, the difficulty in 
finding a consistent vocabulary to describe the intermediate tier reflects the lack of 
consistency caused by continual NHS and local government reorganisation. 
 
3.4.       Methods 
The literature review takes the form of a ‘narrative review’ that makes explicit the 
approach to identification and selection of sources (Pope, Mays and Popay, 2007). A key 
strength of a narrative review approach is that it enables flexibility in search procedures 
encompassing a large and diverse evidence base (Dixon-woods et al., 2004). Literature is 
selected according to relevance as opposed to a fixed set of methodological criteria. The 
narrative review approach was deemed the most appropriate strategy for identifying key 
thematic issues relevant to integrated care systems based upon previous research into 
the regional co-ordination of health and social care systems, given the practical 
challenges faced when undertaking this review.  
 
Key challenges identified following an initial scoping search of the literature and expert 
advice from academics in the field were that: there has not been consistent empirical 
peer-reviewed research into the intermediate tier of the NHS over its seven decades; a 
wide range of sources would be required to generate sufficient insight from past reforms 
drawing from academic and ‘grey’ literatures; it would be necessary to be selective in the 
focus of what areas are deemed relevant to motivate our study given the complexities and 
breadth of issues associated with the regional organisation of health and care systems; 
and that there is no consistent search term(s), reflecting the shifting spatial and 
organisational/administrative arrangements over the seven decades, as outlined in the 
preceding sub-sections. 
 
We adopted a pragmatic approach in our literature search strategy. First, we searched 
four databases (PubMed, Google Scholar, Web of Science, NIHR) for published research 
over the last seven decades of the NHS using a wide range of search terms such as 
‘decentralisation’ and ‘regions’ combined with ‘NHS OR National Health Service’ – using 
access to full texts via two different universities. Subsequent searches for the specific 
organisation names such as ‘Regional Health Authorities’ or ‘Strategic Health Authorities’ 
were later included to support our review, given that the intermediate tier of organisation 
in the NHS has rarely featured as the main focus of empirical studies. We did not restrict 
our search to specific dates. Titles and abstracts of articles were reviewed, extended to 
rapid scans of articles, where necessary. We focused on qualitative published studies 
and/or theoretical literature, written in English. Because of the wide range of search 
terms required this search was extensive but not exhaustive. 
 
Second, through ‘snowballing’ of references key published articles and textbooks were 
identified, including ascertaining key authors in the field. The snowballing of references 
was significant in our search, given the nature of the search required. Additionally, a 
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hand-search of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine library of policy 
documents and pamphlets was undertaken to locate additional policy materials from 
previous reforms. On several occasions, efforts to gain access to empirical studies of 
health authorities have proved fruitless as materials were only available within 
university archives in paper format.  
 
There is relatively limited empirical research explicitly focused on regional and sub-
regional tier(s) of the NHS, given that regions are considered as part of wider analysis 
and accounts of NHS reorganisations. Where available we focus on in-depth peer-
reviewed studies, however, in the absence of empirical studies, we often draw on 
historical accounts of the NHS from well-regarded historians and political scientists as 
well as NHS policy commentators in key journals such as the BMJ to provide insights into 
reforms where limited peer-reviewed academic research could be found. Two NHS 
historians were consulted in locating specific archival materials as well as recommended 
sources. In total, 153 sources were drawn upon. Details of the search strategy are 
provided in Appendix 1.  
 
Narrative reviews have their limitations. They are non-systematic in their format, on the 
basis of selectively identifying literature sources, rather than setting out to document 
exhaustively all published research evidence in a regimented approach, usually with less 
weighting given to the assessing the methodological quality of research sources with a 
fixed set of criteria (Pope, Mays and Popay, 2007). However, narrative reviews are widely 
recognised to contribute valuable approaches to reviewing literature and in many 
instances deemed the most appropriate for policy-orientated reviews and enabling 
synthesis of complex and dynamic processes  (Dixon-woods et al., 2004; Pope, Mays and 
Popay, 2007). As we stated above, our initial scoping review of literature illustrate there 
has been no extensive, in-depth systematic research that has documented and analysed 
the functioning of the intermediate tier of the NHS, and its integration (or lack thereof) 
with social care, over the last seven decades, an issue raised by several key authors 
exploring this area of research (Dopson, Locock and Stewart, 1999; Checkland, Dam, et 
al., 2018). We have already argued in this section that we cannot derive directly 
comparable evidence from one regional reorganisation to the next. Instead, a narrative 
review enabling a flexible interpretive approach drawing from a wide range of sources 
materials to support the identification of key thematic issues was deemed most useful for 
informing understanding of ongoing reorganisation.  
 
Finally, key differences existed between the nations of the United Kingdom and their 
health systems long before the devolution of the UK NHS in 1999. There is, however, a 
tendency for historical accounts of the NHS to be England-centric (Hunter, 1982). Given 
our specific focus on England, the majority of the literature we draw on relates to changes 
and experiences relating to England. It is beyond the scope and purpose of this research 
to unpack distinctions between the four countries, although we note the importance of 
doing this to support comparative studies to encourage learning. 
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4. PUTTING INTEGRATED CARE SYSTEMS IN THEIR GEOHISTORICAL CONTEXT 
To understand the current formation of Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships 
and Integrated Care Systems, we now turn to examine the key responsibilities and 
functions of previous intermediate tiers, how they worked in practice and how this 
corresponds with joint working between health and local authorities. A table providing a 
summary of the different tiers concludes the section. 
 
‘Integration’ of health and social care is not a new policy phenomenon, and at various 
points has been a specific policy ambition for successive governments over the course of 
the last four decades (Humphries, 2015). Whilst it is not our intention to provide a 
comprehensive history of all initiatives for health and social care integration in England, 
it is useful to note calls for the need to ‘unify’ or ‘integrate’ health and social care have 
been present ever since the formation of the NHS in 1948 as part of the post-war national 
welfare state (Wistow, 2012). Mohan (2002) provides an excellent account of the impacts 
of regionalism in the decades running up to the creation of the NHS, however, this era is 
beyond the scope of our review. 
 
4.1. Regions in the tripartite National Health Service  
The NHS was established in 1948 with a ‘tripartite system’ of nationalised hospitals 
administered by Regional Hospital Boards (RHBs), primary care delivered by 
independent contractors rather than salaried government employees, and community 
and social support services delivered by local government. The initial role of the 14 RHBs 
– initially Regional Boards – was to administer and allocate funding for hospitals across 
England and Wales. They were a regional administrative tier that oversaw the Local 
Hospital Management committees – initially District Committees – in the organisation of 
the recently nationalised voluntary and municipal hospitals. Initially, regional population 
for RHBs varied from 1.298 million in Oxford to 4.399 million in Manchester, based upon 
calculations by the Ministry of Health in 1947 (The National Archives, 1947). According 
to the National Health Service Act, 1946, within the establishment of a comprehensive 
health service, the RHBs were ‘for the purposes of exercising functions with respect to 
the administration of Hospitals and specialist services in those areas’ (National Health 
Service Act, 1946, para. 11). Thus, local authorities continued to hold responsibility for 
community services including child and maternal welfare, district nursing, vaccination 
and learning disabilities and non-hospital based mental illnesses; and 138 Executive 
Councils administered the family practitioner services whereby GPs, dentists, 
pharmacists and opticians were financed directly by the Ministry of Health (Rivett, 1996). 
 
Four key functions for RHBs can be discerned. These were:  
 the planning of nationalised hospital services, medical staffing and hospital capital 
works;  
 running certain services such as blood transfusion, pathological services and mass 
radiography;  
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 managing financial allocations to Hospital Management Committees, appointing 
their Chairs, members;  
 administrative responsibilities for providing general support and advice (Rivett, 
1996).  
 
Allocation of resources by the regions was summarised by the Lancet (1950, p. 403) soon 
after the formation of RHBs as receiving block grants and subsequently needing ‘to 
manage their own affairs’. Hospital Management Committees focused on the day-to-day 
running of the hospitals within the catchment of the ‘natural hospital district’ defined at 
the time as an ‘area able to support a general hospital or combined group of hospitals big 
enough to employ a full specialist staff for all normal needs’ (Webster, 1998b, p. 19). 
Initial plans were considered for regions to take over local authority-administered health 
services, such as ambulance services, health visitors and maternity and child welfare, but 
as a concession to local government, these were retained by 146 Local Health Authorities 
(Webster, 1998b).  
 
An early report reproduced in Public Administration (1949) documents surprise at the 
number of regions created (14), with the suggestion that twenty or thirty had initially 
been anticipated. The lower number related to the intention for each RHB to be linked to 
a university medical school, described in Webster (1998) as the catchment of the ‘natural 
hospital region’. At the same time, the territorial geography of the regions was intended 
to not be constrained by local authority boundaries and the potential for their control 
(Mohan, 2002). Despite suggestions that the regional tier would not be overly interfering, 
the Public Administration (Public Administration, 1949) report also raised an opposing 
concern that the regions risked becoming distant, remote bodies. The report continues 
that these initial fears were largely misplaced as ‘it seems that the boards are carrying 
out as envisaged their functions as policy-directing, controlling, and co-ordinating 
authorities, with the role of ensuring the planned distribution of resources and the 
general guidance of the service’ (Public Administration, 1949). Officers of the RHBs were 
appointed (rather than elected) from local government or from voluntary hospitals, with 
some medical professionals and university staff, and occasionally nurses and trade 
unionists (Public Administration, 1949; Klein, 2010) and despite certain national 
influences in respect of pay and conditions, Klein (2010, p. 33) states that ‘[t]he values 
and traditions of localism were thus built into the administrative structure of the NHS 
from the start’. Whilst under the ‘general direction’ of the Minister, the regions were to 
have a key role to support a ‘free and flexible degree of decentralisation control’ (Foot, 
1973; cited in Mohan, 2002). Yet conversely, with the pull from central government 
seeking to exercise firmer control, chairs of the RHBs complained of the political centre 
interfering in their concerns through what were seen as overly burdensome circulars and 
excessive bureaucracy (Klein, 2010).  
 
In respect of the regional administrative function, it was stated in the Lancet (1950, p. 
403) ‘[t]he idea that administrative responsibility for the hospital and specialist services 
29 
 
would be vested in the region was never fully realised … the passing of the Act was not 
accompanied by any sufficiently drastic overhaul of the machinery at Whitehall to ensure 
that circulars, or other decisions, did not by-pass or overrule the regional hospital boards. 
The [regional hospital] boards thus received the insignia of administrative authority 
without the substance, and a certain amount of friction and confusion has followed’. The 
Jones Report produced for Nye Bevan described the ‘fundamental incompatibility 
between central control and local autonomy’ as a consequence of the tension between 
how money was raised and how it was spent (Jones, 1950; cited in Klein, 2010). Yet Bevan 
described RHBs and Hospital Management Committees as having ‘substantial executive 
powers’ to counter the risks of bureaucratic over-centralisation (Klein, 2010, p. 35). 
Reflecting on his time in office in the 1960s, the former Secretary of State for Social 
Services, Richard Crossman (1972; cited in Day and Klein, 1997) stated: ‘In much the 
same way Health Service freedom lies in the fact that the centre is weak and the Regional 
Hospital Boards are strong, while the GPs in their enclave are separated off safely from 
attack’. Crossman is frequently quoted in historical accounts as describing regional chairs 
like ‘feudal barons’, or ‘Persian satraps’ in relation to the ‘weak Persian emperor’ at the 
centre (e.g. Timmins, 2018). 
 
This presents a mixed picture of the role of regions spanning several decades. The RHBs 
were embedded within centre-periphery relations that have long characterised a tension 
within the administrative structure of the NHS – between that of local autonomy and 
national accountability (discussed further in Section 5.1.). Thus, debates over the 
functioning of an intermediate regional administrative tier and how it interacts with the 
local level can be understood to be present from the very start of the NHS. Whilst not 
autonomous, the role of regions in overseeing hospital administration can be understood 
as the product of interaction or negotiation of centre-local relations ‘rather than the 
imposition of national plans’ alone (Klein, 2010, p. 37; our emphasis). Indeed, this 
interaction is reflected in different accounts of RHBs as experiencing regional autonomy, 
central control or something in between (Ham, 1981). At different times, in relation to 
different issues, the ‘centre’ was more or less successful at directing how the regions 
operated. For example, the ability for central government to ensure policy was 
implemented in regions was constrained, particularly with efforts to boost ‘Cinderella’ 
services. Yet, the Hospital Plan 1962 to support an expansion of district hospital 
construction was connected to long-term public expenditure, which proved significant 
for mobilising RHBs in moves towards longer-term planning (Mohan, 2002). Given the 
financial controls implemented by the Treasury in the early years, along with Ministry of 
Health restrictions on staffing and finance (Ham, 1981), regions became increasingly 
powerful as funding increased for an expansion in District General Hospitals, with the 
RHBs shaping priorities of new hospital construction through development plans (Rivett, 
1996), even if the actual increase in capital investment was not as much as the RHBs 
sought (Mohan, 2002). As Ham’s study of Leeds RHB concludes, ‘[t]he capacity of the 
central [government] department to ensure its policies were implemented was limited’ 
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even as the centre became more interventionist in the 1960s through legal and financial 
controls. 
 
Conventional wisdom often presents the early decades of the NHS as a hierarchical 
‘command and control’ healthcare system par excellence. With the exception of 
intervention from the Ministry of Health exercising concern about expenditure levels, the 
centre did not have the levers to command as such, but rather this was policy making was 
through exhortation (Klein, 2010). The initial configuration of regions within the NHS 
may be best understood as operating under a ‘quasi-hierarchy’, given that hierarchies, 
strategy and planning in the health service was not firmly established until the 
introduction of authorities as part of a nested hierarchy that were soon to come about 
through with first NHS reorganisation in 1974 (Exworthy, Powell and Mohan, 1999). 
Indeed, the role of professional policy networks and the professional autonomy of 
doctors during the earlier years in the NHS has been raised as significant in shaping 
decision-making (Exworthy, Powell and Mohan, 1999). On balance, recognising the 
growing role of state intervention, long-term strategic planning and technical expertise, 
and later the rise of technologies of public management enabling central bodies to control 
at a distance, this was a period when regions may arguably be considered their most 
influential with a relative degree of autonomy to pursue their own strategies, if by no 
means unconstrained from national powers.  
 
Over time, the costs of running the health service increased, prompting the 
commissioning of the Guillebaud Report (1956). Counter to the prevailing concerns of the 
Conservative government that the NHS was becoming ‘too expensive’, the enquiry found 
that costs were increasing due to inflation and demographic changes, such that in relative 
terms, costs were actually falling.  Whilst the report did not go on to recommend 
restructuring the NHS, it provided an early foundation for calls for moves towards 
strengthening oversight and supervision in the NHS. Pressure towards unification of the 
NHS to address problems embodied in the tripartite system grew throughout the 1960s, 
with the publication of the Porritt Report (Medical Services Review Committee, 1962), 
whilst the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Social Security were consolidated into the 
Department of Health and Social Security in 1968 (Webster, 1998). The importance of 
bringing together health and local authority services were foregrounded by key reports 
of the Royal Commission on Local Government and the Committee on the Provision of 
Personal Social Services, otherwise known as the Seebohm Report (Seebohm, 1968), 
recommending bringing together different social services into single departments within 
local government (Rivett, 1996). Yet, it would not be for almost a quarter of a century that 
moves were made towards a structural re-organisation of the NHS as the beginnings of 
the ‘introduction of the concept of managerialism represent[ing] a policy paradigm based 
on the belief that organisational change would improve service provision’ (Elkind, 1998, 
p. 1717). 
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4.2. NHS unification and hierarchy of regions, areas and districts 
The first major reorganisation of the NHS came about in the 1970s during a time of 
marked political uncertainty amidst economic crisis. This would be a catalyst, if not sole 
driving force, for the rupturing of the consensus over the post-war welfare regime in the 
UK. Political responses involved the implementation of public expenditure controls and 
a decade of increased industrial action and unrest, alongside growing hostility between 
the medical profession and the government (Klein, 2010). The NHS had benefitted from 
increased funding through successive governments following growth in public 
expenditure on the welfare state in the 1960s to early-to-mid-70s. However, there was 
growing concern throughout the 1960s that the initial tripartite separation of hospitals, 
general practitioners and local authority health services would require a new 
‘organisational fix’ (Klein, 2010, p. 66). The National Health Service Reorganisation Act 
1973 planned under the Heath-led Conservative government would survive the general 
election (which Heath lost) and be implemented by the incoming Labour government, 
who later sought to strengthen democratic input into the planning process. For both 
Conservative and Labour governments, the purpose of the reorganisation was, at least in 
principle, to unify health services, increase cooperation between health and local 
authorities, and to bring about clarity as to the functions of each tier of the system in 
order to promote better management of the health service (Webster, 1998). Yet, as 
Begley and Sheard (2019) denote, the compromises in the lead up to and implementation 
of the 1974 reorganisation have long been perceived as a failure. 
 
This reorganisation saw the creation of 14 Regional Health Authorities (RHAs), 90 Area 
Health Authorities (AHAs) and more than 200 District Management Teams (DMTs), the 
latter not yet established as statutory authorities. Crucially, this was a hierarchical 
unitary system with each tier directly accountable to that above it, characterised by the 
maxim of ‘maximum delegation downward, maximum accountability upward’ (Klein, 
2010: 72). There was an obligation for health and local authorities to work together such 
that in ‘exercising their respective functions Health Authorities and local authorities shall 
co-operate with one another in order to secure and advance the health and welfare of the 
people of England and Wales’ (National Health Service Reorganisation Act 1973, 1973, 
para. 10(1)). The majority of community health services were transferred across from 
local authorities to the NHS, although services outside of NHS control included 
occupational health, environmental health, personal social services and prison and 
armed force health services (Office of Health Economics, 1977). Overall, the 
reorganisation supported increased co-ordination within the NHS, but reduced co-
ordination between community and social services (Ottewill and Wall, 1990; cited in 
Exworthy and Peckham, 1998). Taking place soon after the Local Government Act 1972, 
AHAs became largely coterminous with local government boundaries, with a few 
exceptions (Webster, 1998). It has been suggested that co-terminosity of local and health 
authorities may have been as much a chance by-product of reorganisation rather than 
necessarily a carefully planned outcome (Exworthy and Peckham, 1998), or at least a 
second best option premised on the hope that ‘co-habitation [i.e. co-terminosity] would 
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lead to co-ordination’ given the political inability to fully unify local and health authorities 
(Klein, 2010, p. 67). Not only did the 1974 reforms fail to resolve the long-recognised 
problems of the division between health and social care, but arguably entrenched them 
(Wistow, 2012). 
 
Regional Health Authorities replaced Regional Hospital Boards, covering slightly modified 
but broadly similar geographic territories, given that Wales would become managed 
separately for the first time. The regions were intended to operate principally as a 
planning authority. Regional Health Authorities strengthened the regional tier, with a 
broader remit having responsibility for the health of their local population, not just for 
hospitals as previously, with overall planning of clinical services and employment of 
senior clinical staff (Levitt, Wall and Appleby, 1999). Their purpose was to translate 
national policy priorities into a framework for each region and they had responsibility for 
allocating capital and revenue resources to AHAs in order to meet national objectives, as 
well as providing certain services such as ambulances directly (Office of Health 
Economics, 1977; Rivett, 1996; Dopson, Locock and Stewart, 1999). Teaching hospitals 
also became accountable to the RHA, such that for the first time they were required to 
align with the priorities of the region rather than pursuing their own direction.  Regional 
Health Authorities were therefore largely planning functions focused on longer-term 
strategy feeding back to the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) data on the 
health needs of their population with the intention that they would support the 
development of future health priorities and policies, as well as providing a channel for 
communication both upwards and downwards (Dopson and Stewart, 1998).  
 
Through a hierarchical system of corporate accountability, AHAs were held accountable 
to the RHA above them, with RHAs having the ability to delegate functions to them. AHAs 
had to comply with the orders from their superior tier. Whilst RHAs were corporately 
accountable to the DHSS, they were not regional outposts of the DHSS (contrasting, as we 
discuss later, with the Regional Offices that would subsequently replace them as outposts 
of the NHS Executive and thus part of the Civil Service). However, their members were 
originally appointed by the Secretary of State. As a result of being employees of their RHA, 
staff loyalty has been suggested to lie first and foremost with the RHA and improving 
patient care (Dopson and Stewart, 1998). Significantly, the 1976 reforms under Labour 
would see greater emphasis on local government whereby a third of each RHA (and also 
AHAs, more below) was comprised of local authority members (Office of Health 
Economics, 1977). 
 
Area Health Authorities were the principal operational level for services with a statutory 
responsibility for the running of the health service locally, corresponding to what we may 
call a ‘sub-regional’ tier. Their geographic boundaries were coterminous with Local 
Government following the Local Government Act 1972, with 16 in London, and 74 outside 
of London (Webster, 1998b, p. 108) and they were the lowest statutory level of authority 
employing many staff. Monitoring was based on a hierarchy, with AHAs accountable to 
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RHAs, and RHAs accountable to DHSS (Harrison, 1988). In their composition, AHAs had 
15 members (16 in teaching areas, known as AHA(T)s) and these members were 
appointed by the RHA above them, excluding the paid AHA chair who, like RHAs, was 
appointed by the Secretary of State. Under the 1976 Labour reforms a third of their 
membership thus became local authority members and two additional NHS staff 
members were added. Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) were set-up to advise on 
shared concerns between local and health authorities, with money available for joint 
projects between local and health authorities, albeit with specific rules (Office of Health 
Economics, 1977, p. 9). The 90 AHAs were also coterminous with the 90 Family 
Practitioner Committees which administered GP contracts. Whilst the Family 
Practitioner Committees were intended to be sub-ordinate to AHA, they continued to 
have direct relationships with DHSS (differing slightly in areas with teaching hospitals) 
thus never operating as strictly sub-ordinate to AHAs.  
 
At district level, sitting beneath AHAs in the hierarchy, were District Management Teams 
(DMTs). As the most ‘basic unit of management’ according to Klein (2010), they were not 
statutory authorities, but rather administrative teams appointed by AHAs to integrate 
health services in districts of 250,000-300,000 (Office of Health Economics, 1977: 9).  The 
DMTs were intended as the smallest spatial scale through which health professions 
would collaborate to plan care effectively according to the needs of the population, 
described by the Office for Health Economics (1977, p. 6) as ‘natural health communities’. 
They included a district finance officer, nursing officer, community physician and 
administrator as well as Chair and Vice-Chair of the District Medical Committee 
representing their local consultants and GPs for each district (Office of Health Economics, 
1977). DMTs were managerially accountable to the Area Teams that formed part of AHAs 
(Harrison, 1988). Community Health Councils (CHCs) were also created at District level 
‘to represent the interests of the health service of the public in its district’, albeit without 
accountability or responsibility, their broad function was often susceptible to claims 
directed towards them of being ineffective and irrelevant  (Pickard, 1997, p. 276; see also 
Harrison, 1988). Somewhat ironically, despite their perceived weakness, CHCs were be 
one of the most enduring features of the English NHS, surviving multiple subsequent 
reorganisations, remaining in existence through to 2002/3, when they were abolished 
for being a ‘political inconvenience’ in their frequent oppositional position (Gorsky, 2013, 
p. 106). 
 
As with the initial organisation of the NHS, peer-reviewed empirical research into RHAs, 
AHAs and Districts is limited, although NHS historians and grey literature produced at 
the time provides a basis for understanding how the regions and areas functioned in 
practice. Broadly speaking, the first major reorganisation in the NHS brought with it 
several gains with unification of different parts with some co-ordination across health 
and local authority areas and a population health focus. However, despite the potential 
for joint working between local and health authorities with the external JCCs, they were 
described by Office of Health Economics (1977) as ineffective given that there were no 
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obvious mechanisms to resolve issues concerned with competing economic interests of 
NHS and local government. In London, there were often disputes over boundaries given 
the nature of services in the capital. The regions were ultimately in a difficult 
intermediate position, as, according to Dopson and Stewart (1998), they were criticised 
for failing to challenge the demands of the centre, but also for being overly bureaucratic 
and interfering in local management issues, as well as operating with a surplus of 
priorities and a lack of fairness in how resources were allocated.  
 
The 1974 reorganisation, Klein (2010, p. 76) states, marked the high point of 
‘paternalistic rationalism’ characterised by the ‘grey book’ central manual setting out 
how management and administration of the NHS would be structured. It provided a 
rather rigid organisational structure comprised of multiple layers of decision making, 
even before reaching those within hospitals and community services. At the time, the BMJ 
(1975) argued the absence of clear definition of what ‘delegation downwards’ actually 
meant in practice produced conflicts between the regions, areas and districts (see also, 
Rivett, 1998). Decision-making was by ‘consensus management’ whereby decisions had 
to be agreed by all in the team rather than an Executive figure.  Webster (1998a, p. 110) 
argued that whilst a laudable aim, in practice this was a ‘recipe for paralysis’ resulting in 
lowest-common denominator decisions, although different historical accounts seem to 
vary with regards to the alleged ineffectiveness making decisions in this way. In a study 
of the Yorkshire and Northern RHAs at the time, it was observed that the chair of the 
Yorkshire region instructed local authority members that despite their role in their 
constituencies ‘RHA members were ‘not wearing any hats’ and that they were expected 
to play their part in the management of the NHS as individuals, not as representatives of 
particular localities or interests’ (Elcock, 1978, p. 384). Other concerns were raised with 
regards to the effectiveness and monitoring of the sub-ordinate AHAs, although the study 
found that a comparison of the two RHAs showed operational processes and collective 
personas differed between the regions (Elcock, 1978). 
 
Questions were raised as to whether a regional tier was a cumbersome intermediate body 
complicating the balance between national strategy and policy formulation and local 
autonomy and decision-making. In Scotland, in way of comparison, a different structure 
was present at this time, with AHAs directly reported to DHSS, circumventing a regional 
tier. However, these relations, too, were problematic (Office for Health Economics, 1977, 
p. 29), suggesting regions were not necessarily the problem per se. Prior to the first major 
reorganisation, planning was described as haphazard and ad hoc (Tallis, 1981), having 
RHAs to incorporate longer term planning into day to day activities had certain beneficial 
impact by shifting from management in response to crisis to planned management. By 
the late 1970s, with the planning system fully established, whilst certain regions had 
sought to set the strategic direction for how care should be developed within their 
geography, ‘it was apparent that most Regions had not been able to give consideration to 
community services and to the joint planning of services with local authorities’ (Tallis, 
1981, p. 5). The understanding and information gathering provided by RHAs did provide 
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important insights into areas of difficulty as set out in their regional strategic plans that 
would go on to shape government priority documents (Tallis, 1981). However, the role 
of regions in the collection of local data on behalf of central government may be 
understood to operate with a centralising effect in ways that regions had not previously. 
It is also of note that the reorganisation was said to have had limited impact on General 
Practitioners who consequently took little interest in the changes (Rivett, 1998).  
 
4.3. De-layering, decentralisation and the rise of general management 
On the arrival of the first Thatcher administration in 1979, a key element of reform was 
to simplify the hierarchical layers of administration that now existed in the NHS. It was a 
move to cut administrative costs, along with embedding business-like management 
principles and logics into public services (Greengross, Grant and Collini, 1999). In 1982, 
the 90 Area Health Authorities were abolished and replaced by 192 District Health 
Authorities (DHAs) as statutory bodies, reshaping District Management Teams, covering 
what was described in a government circular at the time as ‘the smallest possible 
geographical area within which it is possible to carry out the integrated planning, 
provision and development of health services’. This occurred during an era in which the 
government increasingly encouraged decentralisation policies (Exworthy and Peckham, 
1998) emphasising the ‘virtues of localism and small size’ with decisions intended to be 
taken as close as possible to where services were delivered (Klein, 2010: 98). This was 
significant, Klein (2010: 99) adds, as it marks the weakening of the authority of experts 
instead focusing on the assumption that ‘local people know best’, a clear challenge to 
centralised planning.  
 
Yet the prevailing local spatial imaginary championed by the Thatcher government was 
also inherently political, as well as contradictory, most acutely felt in the transformation 
of local government over the course of the 1980s (Cochrane, 1993). Amidst hostility 
between the Thatcher-led government and local and municipal socialist councils, the 
‘new right’ under Thatcher increasingly stressed the role of market alternatives, 
privatisation and value for money principles, in political opposition to local and 
metropolitan councils pursuing state intervention and collective, rather than 
individualistic, solutions (Cochrane, 1993). By 1986, the urban Left local authorities were 
weakened and the metropolitan councils abolished. This transformation is significant in 
local authorities increasingly becoming restricted towards being ‘enabling’ through 
adoption of market-orientated approaches to the delivery of local services. Compulsory 
Competitive Tendering embedded in the Local Government Act 1988 functioned to 
transform how local council services were organised. Considerable variation manifested 
across different local authorities with some very supportive of Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering whilst others much less so, although, this period underscores efforts to embed 
market mechanisms and logics within local government.  
 
In the NHS, statutory DHAs were to take over responsibilities from the abolished AHAs, 
becoming responsible for the planning, development and management of services. They 
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were to be the smallest scale geography possible to carry out integrated planning, service 
provision and development of primary care, community services and services relating to 
district general hospitals. CHCs were, as noted above, retained. Prior to the Griffiths 
Review (1983), DHAs followed consensus-based decision-making. However, in a rejection 
of the 1976 Labour reforms, there was now to be a reduced proportion of local 
government members on their boards, whilst worker representation was abandoned 
with trade unions having reduced influence through now only being able to appoint a 
single member (Klein, 2010). Districts were hailed as the ‘natural’ and most appropriate 
geography that would be closest to their communities tailored to their local needs to 
enable  more flexible forms of planning and managing of services for a population 
between approximately 200,000 and 500,000 people organised around the catchments 
of district general hospitals (notably, a similar geography to that of ‘place’ within the 
contemporary Long Term Plan (NHS, 2019a), albeit based on a different organising 
principle); the intermediate RHA covering populations of several million people 
continued to exist during this time retaining their role in allocating capital and revenue 
and increased monitoring responsibilities but stepping back from day-to-day operations 
(Greengross, Grant and Collini, 1999, p. 10; Levitt, Wall and Appleby, 1999). The RHAs 
also retained their ministerial-appointed chairs. Significantly, in the reforms, 
coterminosity between area health and local authority boundaries was also lost 
(Greengross, Grant and Collini, 1999; Klein, 2010). 
 
Long-standing centre-local tensions were not resolved in this move towards de-
centralisation, and the problems associated with removing coterminosity between health 
and local authorities led to further complexities, despite the prevailing policy narrative 
of simplification (Klein, 2010). Efforts were made to bolster joint planning through 
strengthening the existing Joint Commissioning Committees (JCCs) of the 1976 reforms 
by having their own staff and a degree of accountability to the Secretary of State, however, 
this soon came under criticism (Wistow, 2012). As Griffiths (1988; cited in Wistow, 2012, 
p. 105) went on to declare, there was a need the end the ‘discredited refuge of imploring 
collaboration and exhorting action’ whilst the Public Accounts Committee raised 
concerns that joint planning was ineffective. Additionally, during this period, there was 
an expansion of research exploring the different structural, financial and professional 
‘barriers’ to integration between health and social care. It is of significance to 
contemporary reforms that Wistow (2012, p. 105) observes how the framing of the policy 
problem in this way ‘fixed attention on obstacles to integration rather than the root 
causes of continuing fragmentation in planning and service delivery’. 
 
Major changes took place nationally during this period. The ‘centre’ had up until this point 
largely remaining unchanged, but the Griffiths Review (1983) led to the formation of the 
NHS Supervisory Board and NHS Management Board orientated towards what we might 
see as representing the early stages of adopting principles of New Public Management in 
the health service (Dopson, Locock and Stewart, 1999). The problematic split relationship 
between the two national boards would also go on to typify the problems associated with 
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‘separating steering from rowing’ (Day and Klein, 1997, p. 4) and by the end of the decade, 
the Secretary of State for Health would take over the Management Board.  
 
The Griffiths Review marked a significant moment both symbolically and practically in 
the reconstitution of management in the health service (Webster, 1998b), a major turning 
point in public policy introducing market logics into the operation of the NHS (Gorsky, 
2013). Its best known impact was bringing about the end of consensus management and 
the rise of general management, bringing in managers from outside the NHS and the 
pursuit of more business-orientated organisation of the health service. During this 
period, managers were increasingly portrayed as responsible for problems facing the 
health service, undermining their existing ‘diplomat’ style role, and with it, a firm attempt 
to ensure regional Chairs more firmly adhered to the government’s priorities (Harrison, 
1988). The composition of who sat on regional boards had now become substantively 
different over the course of the past few decades. Performance indicators were beginning 
to take on significance in how power was exercised in the health service, with the first set 
of 70 indicators for England circulated by DHSS in 1983 (Department of Health & Social 
Security, 1983) to compare aspects that spanned clinical and financial measures as well 
as workforce and estates between health authorities (Harrison, 1988).   
 
Both RHAs and the Management Board were portrayed as distant bodies according to 
Dopson (1994, p. 338) ‘trapping local management in a strait-jacket of central directives, 
political interference and inadequate central funding’ (see also Dopson, Locock and 
Stewart, 1999). The Merrison Royal Commission Report proposed that RHAs could become 
mini-corporations, an idea proposed by one of the Chairs of the RHAs (Webster, 1998). 
Although this was ultimately rejected by government, it was to pre-empt a major NHS 
reorganisation that would have profound impact on the regional tier of the NHS.  
 
4.4. Purchaser/provider split with regions becoming market umpires  
Following the creation of a separate Department of Health in 1988, the White Paper 
Working for Patients (1989) was published providing the foundation for major structural 
change throughout the NHS. The identified problem to be solved was that the NHS was 
deemed bureaucratic and inefficient so that a new market-like paradigm in healthcare 
organisation was to be introduced (Klein, 2010). Notably, the phrase ‘internal market’ is 
absent from Working for Patients and competition rarely features, instead the policy 
rhetoric is principally that of local delegation (Webster, 1998). The passing of The NHS 
and Community Care Act 1990 was a significant change in the organisation of the NHS 
introducing a purchaser/provider split, which the official historian of the NHS, Charles 
Webster (1998, p. 197) describes as ‘the biggest shake-up the health service had ever 
seen’. The turn of the 1990s undoubtedly represented a significant rupture in the 
administration of the health service, whilst local government had now heavily 
transformed from being an integral part of the local welfare state, most symbolically 
exemplified by disputes over the introduction of the Poll Tax. Specifically in the field of 
social care, the White Paper Caring for People (Department of Health, 1989) emphasised 
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market competition on the basis, if not reality, of fully-marketised conditions with a clear 
separation of ‘purchasers’ and a mixed range of ‘providers’ (Charlesworth, Clarke and 
Cochrane, 2006). Caring for People (1989: para 3.4.3) sets out the claim: 
 
‘Stimulating the development of non-statutory service providers will result in 
a range of benefits for the consumer ... a wider range of choice of services; 
services which meet individual needs in a more flexible and innovative way; 
... competition between providers, resulting in better value for money and a 
more cost-effective service. 
 
Much has been written about the introduction of the quasi-market in the NHS from a 
range of analytical and political perspectives and it is not necessary to rehearse the 
debates here (Bartlett and Harrison, 1993; Robinson and Le Grand, 1994; Webster, 
1998b; Klein, 2010). Most simply, the purchasing of healthcare services was split up 
between District Health Authorities, some GP Fundholders (GPFHs) with secondary care 
provided by hospitals and community services that could seek status as more business-
orientated ‘self-managing’ trusts (Barlett and Harrison, 1993). Family Health Service 
Authorities (FHSAs) administered, if not negotiated, contract payments with GPs and 
others. Crucially, this period uncoupled the organisation of services from a defined 
territorial geography as under health authorities (Exworthy, 1998), and with it, marked 
a period of major change for the functioning of the regional intermediate tier.  
 
With the purchaser/provider split, DHAs became purchasing bodies for both hospital and 
community services. The DHAs received funding allocations to pay for residents on a 
weighted capitation basis, rather than allocating funding for providing services in their 
hospitals. Money was intended to follow patients who were to be considered more akin 
to ‘customers’ (Ham, 1990). The number of DHAs varied over time. In 1991 there were 
190 DHAs, although this reduced to 108 by 1994 (Joyce, 2001) and their population 
catchments varied considerably, from 89,000 to 860,0004, and with annual revenue 
budgets ranging from £13 to £183 million at their creation (Ham, 1991). The renewed 
DHAs had a number of functions: purchasing healthcare services for their residents; 
managing local directly managed units that fell within their catchment prior to those 
units becoming NHS Trusts (which came with increased autonomy and increased 
operational decision-making responsibilities previously at district level); assessing 
population health need and holding public health responsibilities (Ham, 1991). Here, 
DHAs were required to agree priorities, or, in other words, ration services (Levitt, Wall 
and Appleby, 1999). 
 
Therefore, as purchasers now paying hospitals through a new contracting system, DHAs 
became bodies with staff who required expertise in areas such as contracting, quality 
                                                             
4 The reason for the considerable variation is hard to discern, however, it is likely due to the legacies of 
the existing Districts. 
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assurance and public health with the intention that they were to become lean and 
strategic. Districts no longer had direct control over all secondary care providers now 
intended to be ‘self-governing’ units. Perceived power relations between districts and 
providers altered, even between individual managers, with DHAs no longer acting as a 
focal point for translating national policy decisions or providing local head office-type 
services, with Trusts now able to determine their own management structures, acquire 
and sell their own assets and employ their own staff on terms they set (Ashburner, Ferlie 
and Fitzgerald, 1996). Whilst relations between DHAs and FHSAs have been 
characterised as fraught prior to their later amalgamation in 1996 (see Section 4.5.), 
relationships between health authorities and local authorities has been stated as more 
significant, even if the differences in national and local funding allocations were always 
bound to prove challenging (Levitt, Wall and Appleby, 1999). Notably, under Section 28A 
of the NHS Act 1977, DHAs were unable to transfer money in perpetuity to local 
authorities and so the various mechanisms used to work around this issue often 
generated new problems as a consequence (Levitt, Wall and Appleby, 1999). 
 
Following the passing of Health Authorities Act 1995, DHAs and FHSAs had their functions 
merged and transferred to new Health Authorities responsible for purchasing care, and 
undertaking population health needs assessments. Formed in April 1996, Health 
Authorities took on primary care contracting roles from the abolished FHSAs and they 
also had responsibility for:  
 
 joint commissioning strategies to link fundholder purchasing to that of purchasing 
by the Health Authority; setting budgets for fundholding;  
 monitoring providers;  
 developing purchasing skills for fundholders (Wainwright and Calnan, 2011) 
 
These changes brought a shift in rhetoric from delegation and incrementalism to that of 
a return to planning and accountability (Wainwright and Calnan, 2012). Here, Wainright 
and Calnan (2011) suggest that this typifyied the tension between market-orientated 
decentralisation running up against the centralisation of state hierarchy. The separation 
of purchasers and providers prevented the integration of primary and secondary care 
(Rivett, 1996). Indeed, as Rivett (1996) observes, control of the market became a 
concern; NHS Trusts with their new organisation freedoms were not keen for regional 
command to simply be replaced by regional market management. And yet, whilst the 
Conservative Party expressed a pro-market ideology coinciding with the rhetoric of 
devolution, the pull of a centralising national health service and its oversight was 
nevertheless reasserting itself.  
 
Thus, the role of the regional tier never sat comfortably with the purchaser/provider split 
reorganisation (Levitt, Wall and Appleby, 1999). RHAs provided strategic direction and 
oversight of the local workings of the internal market, continuing to exercise a regulatory 
function for both purchasers and providers such that ‘within the confines of upward 
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accountability, they had considerable scope for local autonomy and thus provided a 
distinct and influential level of management between the local and the central’ (Moon and 
Brown, 2000, p. 66). However, the potential for RHAs to intervene sat uneasily with the 
market-orientated dynamics introduced through the purchaser/provider split (Levitt, 
Wall and Appleby, 1999), marking their substantive decline. The Functions and 
Responsibilities Review in 1993 motivated the reorganisation of existing Regional Health 
Authorities operating as the intermediate regional administrative tier in between the 
Secretary of State for Health and DHAs and FHSAs (Department of Health, 1993) into 
becoming 8 Regional Offices (Dopson, Locock and Stewart, 1999). Unlike the semi-
autonomous RHAs, the reduced number of Regional Offices, covering wider geographic 
areas, were to become regional outposts of the NHS Executive, part of the Department of 
Health with the substantively reduced number of staff becoming civil servants (Locock 
and Dopson, 1999). The two regional bodies ran in parallel for two years from 1994 until 
1996 when RHAs were finally abolished following legislation (Locock and Dopson, 2007). 
It marked the end of the administrative hierarchy initially established by Keith Joseph 
back in the 1974 (Webster, 1998).  
 
Significantly, this would be first time in the NHS that regional directors would to be 
directly accountable to the NHS chief executive, as opposed to their respective regional 
authorities (Ham, 1993), creating a tighter line of performance management (Kewell, 
Hawkins and Ferlie, 2002) and signalling the decline of the powerful, and still at the time 
politically appointed, regional chairs. The regional boundary spanning role may have 
been retained but with resources now allocated directly to health authorities rather than 
regions as before, this signalled the decline of the regions as discrete entities (Dopson, 
Locock and Stewart, 1999). As local purchasers were intended to become stronger 
through increased decentralisation, the necessity for the regional tier was seen to have 
diminished (Klein, 2010). Moreover, data collection techniques could be seen to no longer 
require the regions on behalf of central government. Thus, after 48 years with substantive 
regional bodies playing an essential role in the development of the NHS, the regions were, 
if not entirely removed, heavily diminished (Rivett, 1996). 
 
The reorganisation took place as a consequence of what Day and Klein (1997, p. 14) 
describe as ‘increasing disillusion with the role of regions. Several had been embroiled in 
financial scandals of various kinds. And there was a widespread perception that regions 
were a cumbersome, overstaffed and ineffective mechanism for implementing central 
government policy’. The Secretary of State for Health at the time, Virginia Bottomley, was 
cited in the BMJ as declaring the ‘unfinished business’ of regional reforms suggesting that 
whilst RHAs having worked well for two decades their hands-on approach was now to be 
considered outmoded (Warden, 1993). This can be seen in light of the wider policy focus 
on a decentralised service with self-governing Trusts and the ambition to ‘streamline the 
central management structure of the NHS and consolidate joint working between DHAs 
and FHSAs’ (Department of Health, 1993: foreword). Therefore, what remained of the 
regions was to again being move towards a more strategic – rather than operational – 
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role in the purchasing of services (Day and Klein, 1997). However, given the size of the 
NHS, it was reported that there was some wariness within the Department of Health in 
abolishing the intermediate tier entirely following the view that the NHS could not be ran 
from a single headquarters (Warden, 1993).  
 
The function of the new regional offices was to ensure co-ordination – now, significantly, 
ensuring separation – of purchasers and providers (Dopson, Locock and Stewart, 1999). 
This required operating with a structure that had identifiable purchaser and provider 
arms. The regional directors of the revised intermediate tier had dual roles: ‘contributing 
on national level issues as members of the NHS Executive Board and also taking 
responsibility for the performance of purchasers and providers in their region’ (NHS 
Executive, 1994, p. 8). Significantly, with new emphasis on setting performance criteria 
and evaluating providers, as well as the development of purchasing, it was the first time 
the regional tier would hold both roles to manage the market regionally, given that the 
provider management role previously resided nationally with a separate trust outposts 
of the NHS Executive (Ham, 1993; Dopson, Locock and Stewart, 1999; Levitt, Wall and 
Appleby, 1999). Regional offices were therefore intended to function as ‘umpires’ of the 
internal market in their region, along with being mandated with the implementation of 
national policy as well as creating regional health plans and strategies (Kewell, Hawkins 
and Ferlie, 2002). Unlike RHAs, the principle allocation of revenue went to the Health 
Authorities rather than the regional offices, whilst responsibility for GP Fundholder 
budgets although supposed to lie with the regions, was effectively also undertaken by the 
health authorities (Dopson, Locock and Stewart, 1999). Ultimately, the new ‘regions’ 
were less substantive and had far less power (Rivett, 1996). 
 
Changes to regional offices took place amidst changes at ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ tiers, again 
raising questions over the future role of the regions as a level of organisation. The NHS 
Executive was growing in its influence at the centre, whilst the DHAs and Family Health 
Services Authorities were unified into single Health Authorities by 1996 (more below). 
Several NHS commentaries have reflected on the apparent paradox of the time, for ‘as the 
purchaser/provider split brought an element of competition, decentralisation and 
marketisation to the NHS, the centre in practice also increased its grip’ (Timmins, 2018, 
p. 24), such that ‘[a]lmost 50 years after the NHS was first created, in the second half of 
the 1990s it became a national service’ with lines of accountability unambiguously pulling 
control towards the centre, despite the policy narrative of decentralisation (Klein, 2010, 
p. 171). As Locock and Dopson (2007) state, despite rhetoric at the time of ‘single centre 
working’, there was no one single ‘centre’, which variously meant at the time the wider 
Department of Health, the NHS Executive or the regional outposts. 
 
The uncertain role of the regional offices became apparent, with questions raised as to 
whether they were regulators, managers or planning functions, and whether they should 
be supporting or facilitating Trust mergers (Dopson, Locock and Stewart, 1999). Those 
working in the regional offices had to negotiate different instances of boundary spanning, 
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such as balancing control and flexibility, intentions to be light-touch with performance 
management which entailed having to operate firm control in response to political 
pledges about waiting times, as well as negotiating the two different cultures of civil 
service and the NHS (Dopson, Locock and Stewart, 1999). The reforms became 
emblematic of increasing policy churn: ‘With the reduced role for regions, the change of 
role for DHAs and the merger of FHSAs, we found very few islands of stability left in the 
NHS. Many respondents also identified problems with change overload, perpetual 
reorganization and ‘change upon change.’’ (Ashburner, Ferlie and Fitzgerald, 1996, p. 7). 
Indeed, Regional Offices would only last for five years, being briefly taken over in 2001 
by four regional Directorates of health and social care, that themselves would go on to 
last for less than two years (Edwards, 2010). Edwards (2010), writing on behalf of NHS 
Confederation, suggests that the rapid regional churn during this period can be attributed 
to senior politicians being involved in organisational redesign that ultimately failed to 
galvanise real commitment and quickly unravelled as a consequence. 
 
4.5. Remaking the intermediate tier amidst markets and partnerships 
Despite running on an election campaign seeking the abolition of the quasi-market in the 
NHS, this agenda was not pursued by New Labour when elected in 1997. Upon arrival in 
government, New Labour revised existing Health Authorities presenting to Parliament 
the 1997 publication of ‘The New NHS. Modern. Dependable’. This came with a shift 
towards a rhetoric of partnership working typical of the ‘Third Way’ agenda, as well as a 
rise in emphasis on greater integration of health and care services. Echoing previous 
appeals to reducing administrative burdens, the renewed Health Authorities were to 
have a strategic function that ‘will help overcome the fragmentation which characterised 
the internal market’ (The new NHS. Modern. Dependable., 1997, p. 24).  
 
The revised functions of Health Authorities, as set out in ‘The New NHS’ were:  
 
 assessing the health needs of their local population;  
 producing strategy for their local Health Improvement Programme with other 
local partners;  
 decision-making for range and location of healthcare services;  
 determining local targets and standards to meet national priorities;  
 supporting the rapid development of Primary Care Groups including allocating 
their resources and holding them to account (The New NHS. Modern. Dependable, 
1997: p.25).  
 
Responsibility for direct commissioning of services was devolved from Health Authorities 
to new Primary Care Groups (PCGs), badged as building on the claimed successes of GP 
Fundholders and other local commissioning projects. This was intended to bring together 
the strategic input from Health Authorities with innovation of PCGs in the name of patient 
benefit (The New NHS. Modern. Dependable, 1997: p.28). Progressively, PCGs would go 
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on to reach the status as Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), which were statutory bodies 
replacing health authorities in 1999. It was suggested in the White Paper that this 
transition would take up to ten years, but in practice by 2002 all areas had established 
PCTs.  
 
Although present since the late 1980s, we can witness the rise of ‘partnerships’ and 
‘joined-up government’ in public services under the New Labour administration. Health 
and social care has been positioned as an exemplar in this policy shift in emphasis from 
competition towards compulsory collaborative-based relations (Heenan and Birrell, 
2006 see also, Newman, 2001). This is exemplified by strategic level Health Improvement 
Plans (HImPs) supported by 1999 Health Act that enabled the potential for pooled 
budgets and delegating statutory authority to lead organisations. 
 
In 2001, the Secretary of State Alan Milburn MP stated that the NHS was deemed ‘top 
heavy’ by PCTs and Trusts, with ‘confused lines of accountability with trusts reporting to 
the Department of Health’s regional offices and PCTs reporting to health authorities’ 
(Klein, 2010: 242). Thus Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) were established in 2002, 
marking the reinvention of an intermediate tier in the NHS once again. At this point, the 
95 Health Authorities had now been replaced by approximately 200 PCTs, and 28 SHAs 
were created following the passing of The National Health Service Reform and Health Care 
Professionals Act 2002. The SHAs initially covered much smaller territorial geographies 
than previous regional bodies (although larger geographies than the Health Authorities) 
at approximately 1.5m population, although they were later reduced to 10 in number. 
The policy agenda became rhetorically orientated towards developing a patient-centred 
NHS, empowering front-line workers and encouraging innovation. The 28 strategic 
health authorities became responsible for performance managing PCTs and Trusts (many 
of which went on to become ‘semi-autonomous’ with their elevation to Foundation Trust 
status -  the first 10 forming in 2005), and Regional offices were removed, leaving nominal 
Regional Directors of Health and Social Care, although they were outside of the chain of 
accountability (Klein, 2010). 
 
Strategic Health Authorities were statutory bodies that, according to the Delivering the 
NHS Plan (2002), were to be responsible for the day-to-day management of the NHS as 
local headquarters of the NHS. This involved having overall responsibility to hold the 
local health service to account, to balance the books financially whilst meeting targets 
and to build capacity for both acute Trusts and Primary Care Trusts. Their function was 
to create a strategic framework for local health services and to manage PCTs (who had 
the responsibility for ensuring local health services were provided) and Trusts through 
local accountability agreements (Shifting the Balance of Power within the NHS, 2001). 
They were effectively guiding patient choice through taking decisions about the 
architecture of services (Klein, 2010). SHAs were ‘to step back from service planning and 
commissioning to lead the strategic development of the local health service and 
performance manage PCTs and NHS Trusts on the basis of local accountability 
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agreements’ (Shifting the Balance of Power within the NHS, 2001). The function of SHAs 
was having oversight of the needs of the overall ‘health economy’ with NHS Trusts and 
Primary Care Trusts both accountable to the SHA, with SHAs themselves being 
accountable to the Secretary of State in the Department for Health.  
 
Significantly, SHAs also played a mediatory role such that: “Where conflicts occur 
between local NHS bodies or problems arise that threaten the delivery of objectives the 
Strategic Health Authority will intervene and broker solutions as necessary” (Shifting the 
Balance of Power within the NHS, 2001, p. 17). SHAs were thus required to identify poor 
performance and could escalate intervention measures for ‘underperforming’ providers. 
However, this was not the case for more autonomous Foundation Trusts where neither 
the SHA nor Secretary of State could intervene as this fell under the remit of the new 
regulatory body Monitor (Klein, 2010). The initial changes, however, were reorganised 
once again after only two years. PCTs were what Sir Nigel Crisp (2005, p. 2) described as 
representing a shift ‘from being a provider driven service to a commissioning driven 
service’ leading to far fewer PCTs, that were, like the 1974 reforms, to be largely 
coterminous with local authority boundaries, and the SHAs shrank in number to 10. Their 
territories looked rather like the Regional Offices of the Department of Health that were 
recently abolished (Klein, 2010), indeed, resembling more closely the 8 Government 
Offices of the Regions that existed between 1994 and 2011. 
 
A study of governance in the NHS which included interviews with SHA staff, reported 
some variation in the extent to which different SHAs would assert their local influence 
and identity in relation to national policy priorities, although SHA Chief Executives 
broadly agreed that national priorities of balancing of the books and meeting targets was 
one of their central roles (Storey et al., 2010). In their allocation of budgets, SHAs 
exercised their capacity to shift budgets around the health system where some Trusts 
were in deficit or surplus, although this ran into tension with pressure for ‘failing’ Trusts 
who would be sent ‘turnaround teams’ to review and produce reports on action to be 
taken if Trusts were financially unstable, demonstrating the more ambiguous and 
uncertain powers that SHA Chief Executives could exercise (Storey et al., 2010). This 
aspect of the benefits of a strategic body that could ‘hold the ring’ (Checkland, Dam, et al., 
2018) for the health system frequently features in commentaries on the present NHS, 
following their abolition in the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (discussed below). On the 
other hand, in light of the Francis Report following the inquiry into the failings in care at 
Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, its authors reflected on the role of the SHA in 
exercising top-down performance management pressures within the NHS, particularly 
focusing on financial control totals: ‘A theme running through many of the interviews was 
that although the Francis Report had been very critical of a top-down NHS management 
style, overly focused on targets and financial compliance at the expense of the quality of 
care, nothing had really changed in the wider regulatory system, and things had possibly 
got worse’ (Thorlby et al., 2014, p. 23). 
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4.6. Unmaking the intermediate tier with new layers of complexity 
In 2010, a Conservative-led Coalition government was elected in the shadow of the 
2007/8 financial crisis. A programme of austerity measures became a central feature of 
then-Prime Minister David Cameron’s political platform framed around ‘living within our 
means’ and ‘getting the deficient down’. Although the NHS would witness the slowest 
increase in its funding in its history, it would be local government that would experience 
the most substantive budget reductions, with the unevenness of cuts particular impacting 
London boroughs and urban areas with a declining industrial base (Gray and Barford, 
2018).  
 
Despite the suggestion that under the Conservatives there would be ‘no top-down re-
organisation of the NHS’, the White Paper ‘Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS’ was 
published soon after the 2010 general election (Department of Health, 2010). It provided 
the basis for what would amount to a major top-down re-organisation of the NHS. A key 
element of the reforms was to increase local autonomy through the empowerment of 
clinical professionals leading decision-making at a local level: “The Government’s reforms 
will empower professionals and providers, giving them more autonomy and, in return, 
making them more accountable for the results they achieve, accountable to patients 
through choice and accountable to the public at local level.” (Department of Health, 2010, 
para 6.0). Market competition was encouraged and following a ‘pause’ in the 
development of Health and Social Care Bill, associated with concerns such as changes to 
‘any willing provider’ of healthcare services, as well as questions over who would be in 
charge of the NHS (in light of a shift from the Secretary of State to have a ‘duty to provide’ 
to a ‘duty to promote’), the Health and Social Care Bill 2012 received royal assent to 
become the Health and Social Care Act in March 2012.  
 
Regional oversight was abolished under the Health and Social Care Act 2012, marking the 
end of Strategic Health Authorities and Primary Care Trusts. It therefore removed the 
role of regional tier in the English NHS as well as a break of the organisational hierarchy 
of the NHS featuring the Department of Health at its apex (Checkland, Dam, et al., 2018). 
The abolition of the SHAs was justified on the basis that there would be no requirement 
for intermediate coordination as new locally autonomous health commissioners would 
be more effective and efficient working within a national accountability framework by 
‘radically simplifying the architecture of the health and care system’ (Department of 
Health, 2010, para 5.4). The Act created NHS England (legally, the NHS Commissioning 
Board) as an executive non-departmental ‘arm’s length’ public body with the express 
intention of removing political interference from the NHS. NHS England has operated 
with growing influence under the leadership of Chief Executive Simon Stevens: ‘Although 
mandated by the Department of Health it has increasingly operated as policy-maker, 
developing policies in tension with existing legislation, while Ministers have faded from 
public-facing accounts of service operation’ (Hammond et al., 2018). Additionally, 27 
Local Area Teams of NHS England were established as part of the Act to provide oversight 
of their geographical areas, but it was clearly stated by then-Chief Executive of NHS in 
England, Sir David Nicholson, that these would be ‘outposts’ of NHS England rather than 
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autonomous decision-making bodies (Pulse, 2011). Within a year, however, these were 
absorbed into four regional teams that operated with a much reduced budget (Checkland, 
Dam, et al., 2018). The regional teams were intended to manage GP contracts. This role a 
regional requirement for how NHS England was to operate. Thus whilst not specifically a 
devolved regional function as such, it suggests geographical de-concentration of 
administration and management had a role in the new arrangements. 
 
A number of studies examining the impacts of the 2012 Act have demonstrated the 
growing complexity of accountability in what was supposed to be a ‘bottom up’ reform 
without a centrally-defined blueprint (Checkland et al., 2016; Checkland, Dam, et al., 
2018; Hammond et al., 2018). Studies examining the effects of competition regulation 
reported views of both NHS commissioners and providers concerning an absence of an 
organisation responsible ‘hold the ring’ locally as was previously the case for Strategic 
Health Authorities (Checkland, Dam, et al., 2018). Despite the policy agenda to simplify 
the system architecture of the NHS, the 2012 Act reforms increased fragmentation and 
complexity, with subsequent creation of bodies and fora attempting to re-create functions 
of previous intermediate bodies to maintain system integrity, co-ordinating delivery and 
manage performance (Checkland, Dam, et al., 2018).  
 
Moreover, research has suggested that the shift away from PCTs being responsible for the 
bulk of purchasing to a combination of CCGs, local authorities, NHS Commissioning Board 
and Public Health England creates challenging inter-organisational relationships for 
initiatives and services operating at different scales and with different geographical 
territories (Hammond et al., 2017; Checkland et al., 2018). As a result of the 2012 Act, 
CCGs took on responsibility for commissioning the majority of services for their local 
populations. One notable area of exception, however, were those services that GPs 
themselves provided. Concerns about potential conflicts of interest were highlighted as 
part of the justification for NHS England to commission primary care services nationwide. 
This separation of commissioning responsibilities proved somewhat problematic in 
practice. NHS England commissioners often lacked sufficient knowledge about the local 
landscapes of primary care and related care provision they were commissioning – a 
problem compounded across the health service by the departure of many long-standing 
commissioners and managers, as a result of the abolishment of PCTs, with extensive 
situated knowledge and productive inter-personal relationships – and the division of 
responsibilities between CCGs and NHS England meant that it was challenging to, for 
example, effectively shift funding between primary and community care in the interests 
of patients (McDermott et al., 2018).  
 
4.7. Place-based systems, devolution and the return of regions? 
Just a few years after the top-down reorganisation of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, 
collaborative and place-based integration became the focus of national policy. The 
evolutionary changes were initiated by NHS England and marked a significant shift in 
emphasis. The policy direction was first set out in the Five Year Forward View, and it is 
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significant that the word ‘competition’ did not feature once (Hammond et al., 2018, p. 11). 
Indeed, not only is the decline in competition within the policy narrative significant, but 
so too is the continued increasing influence of NHS England, shifting from having 
oversight of the delivery of NHS services towards arranging provision with greater 
responsibility for shaping how healthcare is organised (Hammond et al., 2018). Section 2 
has already set out the recent background to current reforms, including STPs and ICSs, so 
it is not necessary to repeat all details here. However, reprising certain changes underway 
is useful in light of the above sub-sections.  
 
The Long Term Plan (NHS, 2019b) set out the expected roles and functions of ICSs, once 
STPs become more ‘mature’ in their collaborative relationships (NHS, 2019b). A clear 
emphasis is placed on partnership working with a STP/ICS board expected to include 
NHS commissioners, as well as NHS trusts, an accountable Clinical Director from each 
primary care network in their ICS, as well as members from local authorities, and possibly 
the voluntary and private sector, although the role of the private sector in governance 
arrangements is currently unclear. ICSs are to have a locally-appointed non-executive 
chair, requiring approval from NHS England and Improvement, alongside involvement of 
clinical and managerial figures from across the ‘system’ in order to support the 
implementation of decision-making. Additionally, the Long Term Plan (NHS, 2019a, p. 30) 
emphasises that ‘all providers within an ICS will be required to contribute to ICS goals 
and performance, backed up by a) potential new licence conditions (subject to 
consultation) supporting NHS providers to take responsibility, with system partners, for 
wider objectives in relation to use of NHS resources and population health; and b) longer-
term NHS contracts with all providers, that include clear requirements to collaborate in 
support of system objectives’.  
 
Relationships between CCGs are changing, too. Current NHS Clinical Commissioning 
Groups are required to become ‘streamlined’ and strategic, which ‘typically’ will require 
moving towards mergers that lead to a single CCG for each ICS in order to ‘enable a single 
set of commissioning decisions at system level’ (NHS, 2019b, p. 29), although many of the 
‘frontrunner’ ICSs feature more than one CCG (for example, Greater Manchester, one of 
the ‘frontrunner’ ICSs that has ten CCGs working with their coterminous local authorities, 
within their new ICS-wide partnerships arrangements (Walshe et al., 2018)). Integrated 
Care Systems are therefore meant to focus on shared decision-making with providers 
about the allocation of resources, service design and improving population health, 
although under existing legislation, any procurement or awarding of contracts must be 
undertaken by NHS commissioners. 
 
STPs and ICSs (the focus of on-going research by the authors of this report), along with 
other major changes such as the regional teams and Primary Care Networks are 
continuing to develop and therefore it is too soon to draw extensive conclusions. The 
development of the regional teams also remains unclear, and certainly too soon for any 
research to have been undertaken. As discussed below, how the new nominally ‘regional’ 
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teams interact with and shape STPs and ICSs remains a key focus of attention. However, 
existing research illustrates the emergence of several key issues, discussed more 
extensively with reference to previous rounds of reform in section 5. Concerns have been 
raised regarding system-wide accountability in the absence of a statutory body operating 
at the STP/ICS level, limiting the decision-making capacity of STPs, given that primary 
accountabilities remain with existing regulators, boards and the public (Moran, Allen and 
Mcdermott, 2018, p. 5; Moran et al., under review). Moreover, this research foregrounds 
challenges between engaging participating organisations, including local authorities, in 
new arrangements, existing working relationships with organisations in different STP 
footprints and through the continued influence of existing governance structures and 
interventions from previous changes. The extent to which STP leaders have the capacity 
and mechanisms at their disposal to hold partnership organisations to account remains 
a key area of attention. 
 
Greater Manchester has one of the more ‘mature’ set of governance arrangements and 
relationships, and findings from research into health and social care in Greater 
Manchester (Walshe et al., 2018; Lorne et al., 2019) offer some insight into potential 
issues and challenges facing integrated care systems across England. The ongoing 
reorganisation of health and social care in Greater Manchester can be described as ‘soft 
devolution’ because, unlike devolution to the four countries of the UK, the Greater 
Manchester reforms have minimal statutory basis. In what is effectively a ‘front runner’ 
integrated care system, the arrangements can be seen as a form of administrative 
delegation between the Department of Health and Social Care, arm’s length national 
bodies including NHS England and NHS Improvement and the multitude of NHS 
organisations, primary care representative and local authorities in Greater Manchester 
(see further Greater Manchester Combined Authority, 2015). Consequently, Walshe et al. 
(2018: 6) suggest health and social care devolution has ‘not been an exercise in allowing 
local autonomy or control over policy, but over its implementation’. The Cities and Local 
Government Devolution Act 2016 made the formal devolution of NHS functions possible 
to combined authorities such as Greater Manchester. However, more extensive (political) 
devolution has not yet taken place. Nonetheless, the same study foregrounds the ongoing 
work required to hold together the relatively fragile organisational arrangements given 
the divergent accountabilities and regulatory regimes, with the new Partnership Team 
(with its Chief Officer an NHS England employee) using ‘system maturity’ to help leverage 
additional delegated commissioning functions to more closely align with the city-region 
and its wider public service reform agenda (Lorne et al., 2019). Whilst strategic planning 
in Greater Manchester was positioned as a composite of the city-region’s agenda as much 
as the national policy direction, in reality there is little that does not fit with the 
overarching national direction of policy-making focus towards integrated care (Walshe 
et al., 2018). 
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Name Years Population 
(approx.) 
Form and relations Key functions / responsibilities 
Regional 
Hospital 
Boards (14) 
1948 – 
1974 
1.2 – 4.4m  Statutory boards 
responsible to 
Ministry of Health 
 Comprised of 
unelected members  
 
 Allocate resources to and 
responsible for oversight of 
hospitals 
 Oversight of regional policy 
 Provide national policy 
guidance 
 Ensure quality levels of care 
Hospital 
Management 
Committees 
(388) 
Pre-
NHS – 
1974 
Unknown  Responsible to 
Regional Health 
Boards  
 Teaching hospitals had 
own Board of 
Governors, directly 
responsible to 
Ministry of Health 
circumventing regions. 
 
 Day-to-day administration of 
hospital services  
 
Regional 
Health 
Authorities 
(14), later 
reduced to (8)  
1974 – 
1994/6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As of 1991, 2 
– 5 million  
 Statutory body 
responsible to DHSS 
 Chair politically-
appointed by 
Secretary of State, 
with 18-24 members 
included local 
authority members 
and others  
 1976 reforms led to 
1/3 local elected 
members  
 Decision-making 
through consensus 
management 
 
Post-Griffiths Review: 
 Decision-making 
through general 
management rather 
than consensus 
 Chairs continue to be 
appointed by 
Secretary of State 
 
Post-purchaser / provider 
split: 
 By 1994, reduced to 8, 
running parallel to 
new regional offices 
and abolished formally 
in 1996 
 
 Principally planning function 
focused on longer-term 
priorities,  
 Responsibility for the local 
population, no longer just for 
hospitals 
 Allocate capital and revenue 
resources to AHAs in order to 
meet national objectives, 
including resolving competing 
AHA claims for resources  
 Translate national policy 
priorities into a framework 
for each region by producing 
regional plans and ensure 
their implementation 
 Monitor performance of AHAs 
and annually reviewed their 
objectives, plans and budgets 
submitted to them 
 Some direct provision of 
services such as ambulances 
and RHAs employed 
consultants and senior 
registrars. 
 
Post-Griffiths Review: 
 By 1980s, reduced influence 
on day-to-day operations 
instead concentrating on 
capital and revenue allocation 
 
Post-purchaser/provider split: 
 Post-1991, RHAs provided 
strategic direction and 
oversight of the local 
workings of the internal 
market 
 Exercise a regulatory function 
for both purchasers and 
providers 
 
4.8. Summary of intermediate tiers over time 
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Area Health 
Authorities 
(90) 
1974 - 
1982 
500,000 – 
1,000,000 
 Lowest-level statutory 
body directly 
accountable to RHA, 
and employ most NHS 
staff 
 Chair politically 
appointed, all other 
members (15-16) 
selected by superior 
RHA 
 
 Full responsibility for 
operational activities and 
some planning 
responsibilities. 
 To provider staff for Family 
Practitioner Committees 
Largely co-terminus with 
local authorities with Joint 
Consultative Committees a 
mechanism to encourage 
consultative working with 
local government 
District Health 
Authorities 
(192) 
1982 – 
1996 
200,000 – 
500,000  
 District Health Teams 
existed since 1974, 
became statutory 
health authorities in 
1982. 
 Responsible to RHA 
 Decision-making 
through consensus 
management 
 
Post-Griffiths Review: 
 Reduced local 
authority 
membership, worker 
representation 
abolished and trade 
union-selected posts 
reduced to a single 
member.  
 
Post-purchaser / provider 
split: 
 Local authorities lost 
the right to appoint 
members of the DHAs 
 
 Responsible for service 
planning, development and 
management in accordance 
with national and regional 
strategic guidelines, as well as 
provision of facilities 
 To be smallest scale 
geography to carry out 
integrated planning, service 
provision and development of 
primary care, community 
services and services relating 
to district general hospital 
 
Post-purchaser / provider split: 
 Became purchasing bodies for 
both hospital and community 
services for their residents 
through contracting 
 Assessing population health 
need and holding public 
health responsibilities 
through annual report of local 
priorities 
 Managing local directly 
managed units that fall within 
their catchment  
 
Regional 
Offices (8), 
briefly reduced 
to (4) 
1996 – 
2002   
 
2002 – 
2003  
Unknown  Outposts of the NHS 
Executive, part of the 
Department of Health 
with staff becoming 
civil servants 
 
 To ensure co-ordination and 
ensuring separation of 
purchasers and providers as 
umpires 
 Responsibility for monitoring 
the performance of 
purchasers and providers in 
their region 
 Contribute to national level 
issues as members of the NHS 
Executive Board 
 Responsibility for regional 
allocation of resources 
removed, now going directly 
to health authorities  
Health 
Authorities  
(100) 
1996 – 
2002 
Unknown  Statutory unitary 
authorities that 
combined the 
functions of District 
Health Authorities and 
Family Health Services 
Authorities 
(responsible for the 
management of 
primary care)  
 To identify the strategic 
priorities for improving local 
quality through health needs 
assessment for Health 
Improvement Programmes 
and determining their 
investments accordingly 
 Supporting and facilitating the 
development of clinical 
governance amongst all local 
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 NHS organisations, especially 
creation of Primary Care 
Groups 
 Allocate resources to Primary 
Care Groups and hold them to 
account 
 Identifying specialist services 
with insufficient ‘critical mass’ 
to undertake on local basis 
Strategic 
Health 
Authorities 
(28) later 
reduced to (10) 
2002 – 
2006 
 
2006 – 
2012 
1.1 – 2.7m 
 
 
2.5 -7.5m 
 Statutory authority 
responsible for day-to-
day management of 
NHS as local 
headquarters of the 
NHS 
 
 Overall responsibility for 
‘system management’ to hold 
the local health service to 
account, build capacity of 
acute Trusts and Primary 
Care Trusts and support the 
improvement of performance 
 To create strategic framework 
for local health services 
 To manage NHS Trusts and 
Primary Care Trusts through 
local accountability 
agreements. 
Clinical 
Commissioning 
Groups (~210 
since reduced 
to 191) 
2012 - 
current 
221,000 
(median) 
 Membership bodies 
with local GP practice 
members 
 Elected governing 
body comprised of 
GPs, other clinicians 
and lay members 
 Independent, and 
accountable to the 
Secretary of State for 
Health and Social Care 
through NHS England 
 
 Responsible for 
commissioning healthcare 
including mental health 
services, urgent and 
emergency care, elective 
hospital services, and 
community care; 
 Responsible for 
approximately 2/3 of the total 
NHS England budget 
 Responsible for the health of 
local population 
 
Regional 
Sectors, later 
Teams (4) 
2012 - 
2016 
7.8 – 15.6m  Regional offices of the 
NHS Commissioning 
Board 
 Provider oversight function 
 Degree of responsibility for 
commissioning national 
screening programmes  
 Intended to manage GP 
contracts 
 
Local Area 
Teams (27) 
reduced to (12) 
in 2015 
 
2012 – 
2015 
1.2 m – 3m  Local offices of NHS 
Commissioning Board 
/ NHS England – later 
subsumed into the 4 
Regional Teams 
 Principally a local system 
oversight function and 
supports CCG development 
and assurance  
 Had no substantive decision-
making powers or policy 
influence 
 10 LATs had responsibility for 
specialised services, and some 
offender and armed forces 
commissioning 
Sustainability 
and 
Transformation 
Partnerships / 
Integrated Care 
Systems 
(44/17) 
2015 - 
current 
300, 000 – 
3m  
(1.2m 
average) 
 Non-statutory 
partnership 
arrangements with 
non-elected STP leads 
(mostly NHS, 
occasional local 
authority) 
 14 most advanced 
areas have become 
Integrated Care 
Systems (including 
‘devolved’ areas) 
 Develop system strategy and 
planning 
 Develop system-wide 
governance and 
accountability arrangements 
 Lead the implementation of 
strategic change 
 Manage performance and 
collective financial resources; 
 Identify and spread best 
practices across the system to 
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 All existing statutory 
organisations existed 
as previously 
 All areas of England to 
be covered by an ICS 
by 2021/22 that are 
‘typically’ governed by 
one ICS-wide merged 
CCG 
reduce unwarranted variation 
in care and outcomes 
Regional teams 
of NHS England 
/ Improvement 
(7) 
2018 – 
current  
Unknown  Regional teams of NHS 
England and 
Improvement 
 Closer working 
between NHS England 
and Improvement but 
continue to exist 
legally as separate 
entities 
 
 To support local systems to 
provide more joined up and 
sustainable care for patients 
 Responsible for the quality, 
financial and operational 
performance of all NHS 
organisations in their region, 
drawing on the expertise and 
support of our corporate 
teams to improve services for 
patients and support local 
transformation 
 Support the development of 
the STPs and ICSs including 
identity formation 
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5. KEY THEMES FOR INTEGRATED CARE SYSTEMS 
This section focuses on key themes we might anticipate in the move towards integrated 
care systems as part of the ongoing reforms in health and social care across England. We 
do so through synthesising key themes identifiable through our focus on previous 
intermediate tiers in co-ordinating local health and care services and informed by our 
analytical framework motivating this review. It is useful to recognise that the following 
themes are inter-connected rather than discrete.  
 
5.1. Mediating centre-local relations: Autonomy in the shadow of hierarchy 
Strategic planning, system co-ordination, quality improvement and performance 
management have all fallen within the remit of a statutory regional tier over the decades 
as the NHS has been reorganised (Davies, 2014). To discuss the current reorganisation 
including the functions and overall ‘strength’ or ‘capacity’ of the regional tiers of previous 
reorganisations, it is necessary to hold particular regional functions separately to help 
unpack the key issues. Therefore, this section focuses on the role of an intermediate tier 
in mediating centre-local relations focusing on finances and strategic planning. Section 
5.2 focuses on managing local relationships ‘within’ the region (referring to all 
intermediate tiers), focusing on oversight, accountabilities and managing conflicts. 
 
An intermediate tier has functioned as a mediatory, interpreter or buffer-like body, 
negotiating centre-local tensions ever since healthcare was situated principally within 
the remit of a nationalised health service rather than within local authorities (Peckham 
et al., 2005). Attempts to strike a balance between local autonomy and central authority 
is a well-recognised dynamic within the NHS (Checkland, Dam, et al., 2018), our previous 
section illustrating the ‘ever-swinging pendulum’ through waves of reorganisation 
displaying ‘a necessary and continuing tension between a bias to the centre and to the 
periphery’ (Ferlie and Pettigrew, 1996, p. 498). The apparent paradox of ‘centralized-
decentralization’ observable over recent decades has been the source of much analytical 
disagreement, through the centralising of control over strategy and policy whilst creating 
decentralised units for service delivery, the introduction of a market in service delivery 
and performance management regimes (Hoggett, 1996; Peckham et al., 2005). What is 
important for understanding the emerging ICS/STPs arrangements is that they will not 
resolve centre-local tensions, irrespective of their real or perceived strength or their 
statutory or non-statutory basis. 
 
Historically, intermediate tiers played an important role in financial allocations. Regional 
Health Authorities allocated capital and revenue to the Area tier beneath it in the 
hierarchy. Resources delegated to the semi-autonomous RHAs was to support the 
meeting of national objectives, as well as playing a key role in resolved competing claims 
to resources. The creation of regional offices ended this function, with the allocation of 
resources by-passing the intermediate tier, for which we may draw certain parallel with 
the limited remit of the new NHS England/Improvement regional teams. Funding was 
once again allocated to SHAs, along with PCTs receiving funding directly by the 
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Department of Health during the New Labour years, before their abolition following the 
Health and Social Care Act 2012. It is significant that there are current examples such as 
in Greater Manchester whereby aspects of national transformation funding have been 
routed through the devolved partnership arrangements at the ICS level, albeit in the 
absence of a statutory body to hold funding, NHS funds are still held by either NHS 
England or delegated to the local CCGs (Walshe et al., 2018). Importantly, the latest 
STPs/ICSs arrangements do not represent a return to a large statutory authority 
allocating capital and revenue, despite this existing as a significant function within 
past reforms, if undoubtedly strongly steered by central government. Whilst 
current reforms suggest that the intermediate tier should develop system 
planning, it does so without obvious financial levers to achieve this, nor the 
authority to hold lower tiers to account.  
 
Broadly speaking, we can observe a declining influence of the regions within the 
organisation of the NHS, although we would note that there is no neat consensus among 
commentators due to disagreement over analysing the tensions of centralisation-
decentralisation. Arguably, an intermediate tier of the NHS was at its more influential in 
the lead up to the reorganisations of the 1970s as longer-term planning took hold where 
regions had notable influence on shaping the expansion of district general hospitals 
following the 1962 Hospital Plan. How power is exercised across the NHS has altered 
immeasurably over recent decades, even prior to the purchaser/provider split, given the 
influence of the rise of general management, new techniques of performance 
management and the end of consensus-based decision-making. The paradox of increasing 
central control over policy-making and strategy coincided with increasing de-
centralisation of operational control following the 1989 ‘Working for Patients’ reforms 
(Hughes and Griffiths, 2010, p. 71) characterised in the literature whereby ‘greater 
decentralisation downwards is often balanced against tighter accountability upward’ 
(Ferlie and Pettigrew, 1996: 499). Thus, prior to and following the purchaser/provider 
split, the ongoing centripetal pull of powers centrally becomes apparent, particularly 
through performance and financial management, with political expediency often 
overriding a rhetorical commitment to devolution (Hoggett, 1996). It is difficult to 
envisage either STPs/ICSs or the new regional teams being able to substantively 
counter balance national influences (whether arm’s length bodies or Department 
of Health and Social Care), not least given the growing financial and operational 
pressures. 
 
Thus far, we have raised the relative ‘weakness’ of current STPs and ICSs compared to 
previous intermediate tiers. However, through recognising that regions are actively and 
continuously under construction, it should not be assumed that all STPs/ICSs will develop 
in the same way according to national direction alone. Intermediate tiers have historically 
played a significant role in balancing national and local planning priorities, yet there can 
be a tendency within prevailing narratives to document healthcare reforms from what 
Day and Klein (1997) acknowledge as the ‘distorting prism’ of London (see also, Mohan, 
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2002). Not all intermediate tiers operated uniformly across England in the past and 
different intermediate authorities had operated, at times, in varied ways with different 
identities and organisational and political power dynamics. Such variation is present in 
Elcock’s (1978) study of the Northern and Yorkshire RHAs, for instance, whilst Dopson 
and Stewart (1998, p. 93) observe how in-depth studies of local health services have long 
‘questioned the assumption underlying the reorganizations of 1974, 1982 and 1983 that 
policy is made at the centre, transmitted to the periphery and implemented there’. In 
more recent history, whilst some variation was observed in SHAs, the centripetal forces 
of central government grew stronger. A degree of relative caution is required therefore 
in positioning intermediate tiers within the dominant hierarchical organisation of the 
NHS and the control of national bodies, although certainly more recently, studies suggest 
that whilst there may have been some difference in the extent to which national policy 
was tailored to regional priorities, there has been a tendency towards strong central 
performance management regimes and the direct influence of the Secretary of State and 
Prime Minister discouraging major local flexibility and difference (e.g. Storey et al., 2010). 
This dynamic for SHAs was captured in the phrase: ‘what the Government of the day 
wants the health service to deliver, we deliver’ (Storey, 2011, p. 638). As we discuss more 
fully below, the significance of existing histories of working together, and indeed, long-
standing local organisational tensions, as well as the influence of local government, may 
prove relatively influential in diverging to a relative extent from the expected functioning 
of STPs/ICSs in the eyes of national bodies. Indeed, NHS England and others have 
suggested they recognise that ‘one size does not fit all’. Nonetheless, given recent history, 
how this is negotiated in practice is likely to sit in sharp tension with the emphasis on 
national frameworks, maturity indexes and ‘must dos’. 
 
Overall, compared to previous years, non-statutory ‘system-level’ integrated care 
systems may be considered much less powerful, without the authority over lower 
tiers as with previous RHAs or SHAs which operated with relatively considerable 
influence over strategic and financial planning. The current ‘system’ level 
partnerships are composed of local member organisations, rather than as discrete 
entities, situated within a broadly hierarchical structure. Moreover, each 
constituent organisation retains its existing accountabilities and statutory roles. 
Ultimately, the capacity for STPs and ICSs to counter overarching national 
influences (albeit now from NHS England and Improvement rather than 
necessarily Department of Health as with previous reforms), would appear 
relatively constrained, given the continued impact of hierarchy in the organisation 
of the NHS and the minimal formal levers at the ‘system’ level. STPs/ICSs continue 
to experience tensions of the past balancing the hierarchical role of the centre and 
local autonomy and difference, although the reach of national bodies may prove 
challenging to resist.  
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5.2. An intermediate body to hold the ‘system’ together  
When it was decided in the early 1990s that the long-standing, albeit heavily reformed, 
Regional Health Authorities were to be abolished in light of the purchaser/provider split 
in the NHS, the Secretary of State at the time remarked that the changes were resolving 
the ‘unfinished business’ of the regions (Warden, 1993). Yet, as documented in Section 4 
above, when intermediate tiers have been removed in recent decades, they have tended 
to have been reinstated soon after (Storey, 2011). Where the last primary legislative 
changes to the NHS in England were motivated by a policy agenda seeking to ‘radically 
delayer’ the NHS (Department of Health 2010, p5) removing an intermediate tier of 
organisation, taking a longer perspective on NHS reform, it should not be surprising that 
the current reorganisation resembles a return to a multi-tiered structure. The vacuum 
created through the absence of a co-ordinating organisation or authority overseeing 
strategic planning, competing interests and managing relationships across more-than-
local geographies following the abolitions of SHAs is a notable theme in recent research-
led literature.  
 
The current reforms appear to bring back in intermediate tiers at ‘regional’ and 
‘system level’ just a few years since the Health and Social Care Act 2012 that in terms 
of size broadly resemble the structure of that of regions, areas and districts. 
However, due to the growing complexity, diversity of public, private and voluntary 
sector agencies and organisations involved in different aspects of the organisation, 
provision and regulation of healthcare, the latest reforms are only an echo of the 
hierarchically-structured, nested scalar architecture of accountabilities that 
characterised the first major structural reorganisation of the NHS in the 1970s. 
Organisational and operational complexity are not ‘disentangled’ by the latest 
reforms but worked around, even if efforts are underway to clarify (if not simplify) 
what is co-ordinated at different spatial scales. Recent research into health and social 
care devolution in Greater Manchester (Lorne et al., 2019: 4) illustrates the ‘multi-scalar’ 
organisation of health and social care is ‘constructed through the interplay of 
overlapping, entangled and unstable negotiations of power that hold together rather than 
exist at a particular spatial scale a priori’ encouraging ‘attention to the ongoing 
arrangement of different local, regional or national actors and how they interact and 
intersect’. Crucial to this is that the purchaser/provider split remains in place, despite 
political and technical questions raised over its future. Consequently, it is most relevant 
for the remainder of this sub-section to focus on the changing role of an intermediate tier 
managing local relationships post-1991, whether as regional offices that worked to ‘hold 
the system together’ (Dopson, Locock and Stewart, 1999) or Strategic Health Authorities 
that existed to ‘hold the ring’ (Checkland, Dam, Hammond, et al., 2018).  
 
Research suggests there was some evidence of positive relationships between health 
authorities and the regional offices, with the regions supporting local co-ordination and 
cohesion, helping to share learning, aiding communication and keeping contact with what 
was happening locally (Dopson, Locock and Stewart. 1999). At the same time, the same 
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research denotes the fine balance that was required to be struck between intervention 
and ‘light touch’ monitoring of performance. Despite the reintroduction of provider 
monitoring powers for the regional offices, concerns were raised as to whether they had 
sufficient clout to intervene in the market and whether the regional tier, no longer as a 
statutory authority, had been undermined as resources were allocated directly to health 
authorities, bypassing the regions (unlike with RHAs). Additionally, issues existed as to 
whether the regional offices lacked capacity to counter the influential Trusts, with the 
suggestion that they could struggle with challenging major service reconfiguration. 
Parallels between the role of the regional offices and the emergence of regional teams, as 
regional outposts may be drawn. Indeed, the transitional dynamics as regional offices 
understood their role shifting from that of market umpires towards relationship 
managers could prove instructive here (Kewell, Hawkins and Ferlie, 2002). With the 
return of more substantive statutory bodies, in way of Strategic Health Authorities, the 
intermediate tier had more ability, or at least, authority, to be able to broker local 
relationships with a stronger control over capital expenditure as a key lever on offer to 
the SHA (Storey et al., 2010). Yet, the ability of the SHA to hold together their health 
economy was also heavily steered by national priorities. Ultimately, it may be considered 
beneficial, if not necessary, to have a body that oversees the co-ordination of local 
organisations and the configuration of services from a more-than-local spatial scale in 
attempts to balance different parts of the ‘system’.  
 
Unlike previous intermediate tiers, and whilst recognising that the current 
arrangements are evolving, there is a notable absence of mechanisms to achieve 
and sustain agreements given the inevitable conflicts and disagreements 
embedded within the existing organisational and legislative landscape. Just as the 
relations between STP/ICS and the new regional teams remains open-ended, 
establishing and managing the relationships between ‘place’ level and how this 
intersects with the STP/ICS ‘system’ remains a key area of importance and 
uncertainty. The place level is significant in that this may be broadly understood as local 
authority area, a more enduring geographical territory with more defined (if not 
uncontested) identities. It is the level with which local authorities are to work together 
with NHS commissioners, however, the expectation set out by NHS England is to move 
towards quasi-mergers towards having one CCG across the geography of the STP/ICS. 
There can be instances of multiple places in existence across and beyond the boundaries 
of each STP/ICS. It has not unprecedented historically within the NHS, for the geography 
of intermediate tiers to exceed the scale of local authorities and thus potential control 
(Mohan, 2002). However, there is uncertainty over how the different relations 
between organisations comprising each STP/ICS are expected to ‘hold together’ 
given the complex and uneven geographies of organisations and authorities within 
(and beyond the boundaries of) each STP, with local authorities having their own 
local priorities and politics (more in Section 5.6.). In addition, ‘place’ level in the 
evolving system is currently left undefined, with no central direction as to which 
organisations will collaborate, over which types of service.  As partnership 
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agreements, we would expect the functioning of STPs and ICSs to rely on building and 
sustaining relations of mutual accountability between different organisations within and, 
at times beyond, geographical areas which will require substantive ongoing work and 
energy. How collaborations operate at ‘place’ level will have an important role in 
determining how this plays out in practice.  
 
5.3. Negotiating competition and co-operation 
The intermediate tier can shape dynamics of competition and co-operation, irrespective 
of any changes to their statutory basis according with current legislation. Recent previous 
studies of SHAs outline how they sought to strike a balance between making competition 
work, particularly given the push for organisational autonomy intended for the 
Foundation Trust model, whilst also recognising at least some need for collaboration 
(Storey et al., 2011). Studies since the Health and Social Care Act 2012 have found that 
whilst the norms and further adoption of market principles have become in many cases 
embedded, the everyday practices of commissioners often tended to favour collaborative 
working (Osipovič et al., 2016; Sanderson, Allen and Osipovic, 2017). It is not currently 
clear how STPs/ICSs will manage the dynamics between cooperation and competition 
within each system. 
 
The treatment of private and voluntary sector providers in STPs/ICSs is ambiguous. The 
latest Health and Social Care Act 2012 reforms continue to exist, with private health 
providers able to operate as before, although their status in the governance arrangements 
is unclear. Despite the lack of emphasis on market competition following the publication 
of the Five Year Forward View in 2014, the market regime of the 2012 Act has not been 
abolished. In the absence of legislative change, a possibility of increasingly competitive 
STP/ICS dynamics ‘within’ each system remains open given that intermediate tiers are 
not by definition ‘anti-competition’. For instance, the regional offices were intended to 
function as ‘market stewards’ and although the economic regulator has signalled 
declining emphasis on competition and increasing permissiveness of more collaborative 
approaches to commissioning (Osipovic et al., 2019), it  is conceivable this could alter 
under changing political circumstances in central government. Conversely, there is 
potential for complaints from the private sector given that they do not currently feature 
prominently in emerging system-wide governance arrangements (Sanderson, Allen and 
Osipovic, 2016).  
 
We should expect both the latest ICS/STPs and regional directors to both operate 
with some ambiguity in their functions, particularly in a period of major change in 
policy direction (i.e. the turn from competition to coordination through 
cooperation). This was the case for regional offices in the years following the creation of 
the internal market uncertain as to whether they existed to regulate, manage or plan for 
their regional geographies and local providers (Kewell, Hawkins and Ferlie, 2002). 
Collaboration between NHS providers can be encouraged at the STP/ICSs level and 
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broadly speaking, this has been the overarching publicly expressed position of NHS 
England. However, this cannot be enforced as a consequence of the continued impact of 
legislation whereby each organisation continues to be regulated as separate 
organisations.  
 
5.4. The continuous search for the ‘best’ size and scale 
The last seven decades of reform show there is neither consistency nor consensus over 
what spatial scale is ‘best’ to take decisions over the co-ordination of health and social 
care, nor agreement over how to do it. Through tracing the pendulum swing of re-
organisations over previous decades, we can observe the changing role of the regions 
shaped by a re-shuffling of which particular territorial geographies and spatial scales are 
deemed ‘most appropriate’ or ‘best’ for different functions, roles and responsibilities. The 
literature demonstrates considerable variation in the size, form and function, as well as 
differing claims to the ‘natural geographies’ for organising care over the decades. For 
instance, we can observe how organisation centred upon district general hospitals in the 
1960s shifts through to an emphasis on ‘community-based’ care in recent decades, 
dovetailing to some extent with particular notions of localism. Yet, even in recent years, 
we may distinguish a notable shift in the positioning of STPs as the ‘natural’ geography 
for transforming the organisation of care (NHS, 2015, p. 6) towards increasing emphasis 
on the ‘natural geographies’ of the neighbourhood within the formative stages of Primary 
Care Networks as the ‘cornerstone’ of integrated care (NHS, 2019b). Whilst working 
across both spatial scales is of course not incompatible, given the evolutionary nature of 
policy-making involving considerable ambiguity, disagreement over what ‘natural 
geographies’ of organisations are best for what decisions may well prove significant, as 
the preceding sub-sections have already suggested. 
 
Recent literature highlights how commissioners under the Health and Social Care Act 
2012 were allocated responsibilities for different services creating a complex 
commissioning landscape. Checkland et al. (2018) illustrate that for specialist 
commissioning, the national level sets priorities and strategy, whilst contracting and the 
managing of relations between commissioners and providers takes place locally, via the 
local area teams. Moreover, increasing numbers of CCGs merging in recent years, appears 
to demonstrate a recognition of the need to commission many activities beyond the 
geography of the original size of CCGs, towards that of the system-wide or sub-system 
wide scale of commissioning. However, caution has been expressed in assuming that the 
(re)turn to system-level commissioning will inevitably lead to improvements in 
commissioning in itself, or that the existing problems associated with fragmentation will 
be resolved through this move towards STP/ICS wide commissioning (Checkland, 
Hammond, et al., 2018). Where joint decision-making requires seeking and maintaining 
consensus, recent research in ‘devolved’ Greater Manchester suggests that finding 
agreement over what scale is best for what particular decisions may prove challenging, 
particularly where both NHS and local authority members are involved or engaged, even 
with relatively coterminous local government and CCG geographies (Walshe et al., 2018). 
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As outlined above, the ability to sustain contentious strategic decisions that impact on a 
complex organisational and operational landscape should be anticipated to be 
challenging.  
 
It is well-recognised that integrated care is a malleable concept, interpreted in different 
ways in theory and in practice (Goodwin and Smith, 2011). A look to past 
reorganisations illustrates that there is no ‘perfect scale’ for ‘integrated’ (or 
unified) commissioning/planning, and establishing ‘where’ is best depends on the 
particular service or function under question. Indeed, historical perspectives 
demonstrate the ways in which the ‘where’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions over 
planning or commissioning are shaped by different political strategies, policy 
trends and enduring organisational legacies impacted by both national reforms 
and particular local context. Consequently, for STPs and ICSs, given the current 
integration reforms rely substantively on building and maintaining collaborative 
relations, we would anticipate finding consensus over where best to take decisions 
within STPs/ICSs a recurrent challenge that does not easily get resolved, even 
where there may be broad agreement on the overarching strategic direction of 
organising care. 
 
5.5. Challenges with joint working between local government and the NHS 
The above sections have focused principally on the NHS. However, the relationships 
between the NHS and local government are significant, as well as other partners and 
agencies involved in the co-ordination of health and social care services. Importantly, 
most social care is now provided by the private sector. Local government rests on a very 
different governance framework to that of NHS organisations, with far stronger local ties, 
connected to different notions of local political democracy and autonomy. Moreover, 
alongside growing attention towards place and the wider social determinants of health, 
the role of public, private and voluntary sectors in wider fields of public policy, such as 
housing, environment and education is, once again, important. Various structures and 
mechanisms to bring health and local government into closer alignment have been used 
in efforts to overcome the divides between NHS and local government since 1948. 
Assumptions persist relating to joint commissioning (or planning) necessarily leading to 
the improvements in quality and efficiency, in part shaped by a problem of conceptual 
ambiguity, although it is notable that of literature on joint commissioning of health and 
care, a relatively small proportion is based on in-depth peer-reviewed academic work 
(Dickinson et al., 2013). 
 
Aligning geographic boundaries between local authority and NHS organisations has long 
featured as a structural ‘solution’ to closer working between health and social care.  As 
outlined in Section 4, coterminosity has ebbed and flowed over the years. Efforts to 
achieve coterminosity at different spatial scales between health, social care, as well as 
other areas such as education and housing agencies, inevitably creates a dilemma of 
finding coterminosity at one scale at the neglect of others (Exworthy and Peckham, 1998). 
Bringing together NHS and local authority budgets in a satisfactory way that co-ordinates 
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different funding arrangements has proven a persistent challenge (e.g. Judge and Mays, 
1994). Going back to the 1974/6 reforms, we can observe challenges relating to decision-
making through consensus management, particularly amidst different organisational 
structures, budgets and allocation of funding oversight, geographic boundaries and 
planning cycles (Glendinning and Coleman, 2004). Moreover, overcoming the challenges 
between different professional identities and ‘cultures’ is well-recognised enduring issue 
(Glendinning and Coleman, 2004).  
 
Joined-up working through partnerships to counter fragmentation has received 
considerable attention in recent decades in England. There has been a tendency for 
emphasis to be placed on facilitating joint commissioning through establishing new 
structures rather than necessarily providing clear information regarding what and how 
joint commissioning should be achieved (Dickinson et al., 2013). Reflecting on the 
tendency for structural ‘solutions’, Glasby et al. (2011) state that ‘evidence and 
experience suggests a series of more important processes, approaches and concepts that 
might help to promote more effective inter-agency working—including a focus on 
outcomes, consideration of the depth and breadth of relationship required and the need 
to work together on different levels’. Moreover, Hudson (2011) reflecting on ten years of 
joint commissioning, remarks on the paucity of achievements despite a plethora of policy 
initiatives and widespread promotion of ‘partnerships’ within policy. Indeed, we might 
be wise to recognise that a turn to ‘place’, along with prevention and moving care closer 
to home, has a much longer history in health and social care, despite renewed enthusiasm 
in recent years, featuring as one of the imperatives of joint commissioning (Hudson, 
2011). Recent analysis of the Better Care Fund initiative has been suggested to have faced 
boundary issues where STP footprints do not align with that of CCG and/or local 
authorities, whilst momentum behind the newer STP plans may have undermined focus 
on the Better Care Fund (Forder et al., 2018). In line with international evidence, research 
into the Better Care Fund has demonstrated challenges in agreeing and aligning 
programme spending as well as issues with risk management and joint financial 
responsibilities (Harlock et al., 2019). For STPs and ICSs, we would expect many of the 
existing challenges to continue. 
 
At present, it is possible to discern two major issues affecting Local Authority/NHS 
cooperation in the evolving system. Firstly, there is ambiguity about the role of 
Local Authorities in STPs/ICSs. The NHS Long Term Plan (2019a, p. 30) states that 
there is ‘a clear expectation’ that Local Authorities will ‘wish to participate’ in 
STPs/ICSs. This suggests a lack of engagement prior to the publication of the Long 
Term Plan, and clarity over the nature of Local Authority ‘participation’ remains 
lacking. Secondly, the obvious level at which joint working between the NHS and 
Local Authorities will be operationalised is the level currently labelled as ‘place’. 
This is described as covering a population of 250-500,000 people, but at present it 
remains entirely undefined, beyond a vague description of the development of 
‘provider alliances or other collaborative arrangements’ (NHS, 2019b). This lack of 
clarity makes it very difficult for Local Authority leaders, who may not be able to 
clearly identify who it is they should be collaborating with across a particular area.  
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The paradoxical term ‘statutory voluntarism’ has been used previously to convey the 
problems associated to the mandating of partnership and co-operation between health 
and social care organisations (Paton, 1999, p. 69). In light of the current changes to 
integrate care, we might now reflect on the further challenges of non-statutory 
mandatory voluntarism, whereby NHS-centric policy-making struggles to overcome 
historic divides between organisations and across different geographies, not helped by 
the lack of clarity associated with both ICSs and the currently designated ‘place’ level of 
the system. It is perhaps noteworthy that ‘place’ level corresponds to the approximate 
size of District Health Authorities following the 1982 reorganisation.  
 
5.6. Ensuring adequate democratic accountability and public involvement 
Literature on the early stages of STPs reflects the difficult formative stages of their 
development with the wider public largely excluded from the process, arousing suspicion 
and political contestation (Black and Mays, 2016; Hammond et al., 2017). Connecting 
with the preceding sub-section, commentators have noted the substantial institutional 
barriers to integrating health and social care through the STP process, given that it is local 
authorities that have experienced far more pronounced financial challenges with 
substantive cuts to their budgets over the previous decade (Walshe, 2017). However, 
whilst recent literature illustrates tricky relationships between the wider public and the 
latest reforms, this is by no means a new phenomenon. 
 
With compromise and complexity embedded in the tensions between local government 
and a national health services long featuring in the organisation of health and care 
services in England, intermediate tiers are bound up within ‘the conflict between those 
who regard the NHS as a body needing only effective and efficient management and those 
who believe it must be democratically accountable’ (Elcock, 1978, p. 396). The changing 
composition of decision-making bodies is of importance to these debates. Since the 
Griffiths Review of the 1980s, who sits on boards of intermediate tiers has altered, with 
the erosion of trade union and workforce representation. Decision-making based on 
consensus – often critiqued for lack of efficiency – was abolished in a move to the 
principles of general management and executive decisions. Until the abolition of Regional 
Health Authorities, Chairs were politically appointed by the Secretary of State, although 
whether this represents democratic accountability may well be rightly contested. Taking 
a more recent look at local democratic involvement and political debate within health and 
local government, we may consider the ongoing significance of Health and Wellbeing 
Boards. Despite varying quite considerably in their structure and representation, Health 
and Wellbeing Boards are an existing mechanism as ‘system stewards’ that will continue 
to have relevance (if not necessarily influence) in the latest (re)turn to place-based 
services and systems (Coleman et al., 2014; Coleman, Dhesi and Peckham, 2016; Local 
Government Association, 2019). Likewise, as statutory mechanisms, Health Overview 
and Scrutiny functions of local authorities will also continue to be relevant. Put another 
way, current reforms may be wise to recognise the existing mechanisms in place that link 
NHS and local government in the rush to roll-out STPs and ICSs. Following the previous 
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sub-section, the contradiction between narratives of ‘partnership’ and top-down 
directives again raises questions over patient and public involvement in priority-setting 
within STPs and ICSs (Coultas, Kieslich and Littlejohns, 2019). Recent research cautions 
that where failure to earn public trust in large-scale change in the NHS may be counter-
productive for sustaining collaborative relationships required for binding together STPs, 
and now ICSs (Coultas, Kieslich and Littlejohns, 2019).  
 
Moves to bring local government and NHS organisations closely together through 
the creation of STPs and ICSs brings us back to long-standing tensions shaping the 
organisation of health and social care in England. With local government and NHS 
organisations having completely different centre-local governance contexts, it is 
inevitable that problems will occur in the new partnership arrangements. We 
began this section by outlining the inherent tension of an intermediate tier situated 
within centre-local relations within the NHS existing on one hand as a national 
service which is locally managed, on the other, groupings of local services within 
national guidelines (Butler, 1992: 125). Integrated care systems are likely to face a 
challenging relationship with the public – variously, as patients, voters, workers 
and carers – regarding how they will seek to simultaneously hold NHS 
organisations and local authorities to account locally, regionally, and nationally.    
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6. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this literature review has been to examine previous intermediate tiers in 
the organisation of the NHS in England, to understand what levers and mechanisms were 
available at ‘regional’ and/or ‘sub-regional’ levels in the co-ordination of services and 
how they functioned in practice. It has also considered the roles and relationships with 
local government in the integration of health and social care services. There has not be 
sustained, systematic research into the role of intermediate tiers of the NHS throughout 
its history, and we should exercise some degree of care when drawing conclusions. 
Nonetheless, we have drawn on various studies to establish a series of key themes to help 
inform what issues and opportunities we should anticipate as the new systems 
architecture of Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships and Integrated Care 
Systems develop over the next few years. 
 
On balance, the latest turn to intermediate tiers is a comparably ‘weak’ arrangement, 
operating as looser collaborative partnerships rather than as intermediate tier statutory 
authorities. The extent to which an intermediate body has capacity to challenge the 
influence of national bodies – whether arm’s length bodies or the Department of Health 
and Social Care – has demonstrably declined in recent decades; in the absence of 
statutory authority, and given the financial strain faced across the NHS and local 
government, the ability for ICSs and their constituent partnership organisations to 
pursue and agree their own system-wide agenda diverging from national policy-making 
(and any associated resources) may be constrained. A distinctly emergent, iterative 
approach to policy-making has been adopted encouraging local flexibility and place-
based approaches to health and well-being. Yet how a top-down reorganisation is 
negotiated given the suggested unwillingness (or inability) to pursue major primary 
legislative change will endure as an ongoing challenge, in light of the continued influence 
of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, and the organisational complexity of the current 
health and social care landscape. 
 
The evidence would suggest certain benefits of an intermediate body seeking to co-
ordinate some services over larger geographic areas than that of the existing Clinical 
Commissioning Groups. The on-going mergers of CCGs would seem to be a recognition of 
this. Indeed, whilst not all NHS managers may rush to champion the return of Strategic 
Health Authorities, having some capacity to allocate resources in the interests of the 
wider local or regional system, rather than solely organisational interests, may well find 
support. Nonetheless, it is important to recognise that in the absence of legislative 
changes, organisational decision-making and protectionism will continue in some form. 
The trend towards increasing the size and geographical coverage of CCGs up to the ICS 
level through mergers may also bring problems. Our review suggests that there is a 
continuing role for sub-regional oversight at a geographical scale of approximately 250-
500,000 population. This is the level currently referred to as ‘place’ in the NHS Long Term 
Plan, and its form, responsibilities and structure is at present left undefined. This is 
potentially problematic, as it is clear that the fine grained oversight of the delivery of local 
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services such as primary and community care requires detailed local knowledge and 
strong relationships across a geographical territory which is intuitively meaningful to 
those involved, including the public (McDermott et al., 2018). It is therefore important 
that the scope and role of ‘place’ in the evolving system is defined.  
 
History would suggest that the impact of the current reforms may to some degree play 
out in different ways in different places. Existing relationships, organisational legacies, 
and influential senior leaders will likely impact the extent to which current integrated 
arrangements will develop and be sustained. Similarly, relationships with local 
authorities, and local elected officials, may prove important in the functioning of the new 
integrated care systems. The tensions between the National Health Service and local 
government will not be resolved by changes in the NHS intermediate tier governance 
arrangements in spite of current enthusiasm for place-based working. Co-terminosity 
and co-commissioning have been sought by local government and health authorities 
throughout the years, and although intuitively attractive, debates exist over the extent to 
which they have been effective. The strength of partnership working may be tested by 
contentious decisions, both between organisations within Integrated Care Systems, but 
also in relation to local citizens and patients. Local and national political dynamics may 
well continue to shape and constrain the latest reforms, especially the ongoing 
uncertainties over social care funding. 
 
Despite facing continuous re-invention, a regional or sub-regional tier has been a 
consistent feature for almost the entire history of the NHS. Their purpose, function and 
operation has shifted considerably over the years. Given the loss of an intermediate 
statutory authority providing strategic and financial oversight in recent years, it should 
be unsurprising we are witnessing a return to at least some elements within 
contemporary reforms. Whilst the literature illustrates the different ways in which such 
intermediate tiers have operated in the NHS, as a healthcare system that continues to be 
influenced by the hierarchy of national bodies, the literature suggests there is benefit in 
having an intermediate tier to negotiate centre-local relations. However, the latest 
iteration does not currently have the same powers as past authorities, and the complexity 
of governance arrangements necessary to compensate for the lack of statutory status of 
ICSs may make taking decisions and sustaining agreement challenging. The role of the 
NHS England/Improvement regional teams remains as yet unclear, although we may 
draw parallels with previous roles of the Regional Offices that operated as outposts of the 
NHS Executive, rather than the more influential role of the semi-autonomous Regional 
Health Authorities. Furthermore, we can observe a long history of uneasy relations 
between health and local authorities. The level currently being referred to as ‘place’ will 
be crucial here, and its role and remit needs to be urgently clarified.  
 
Finally, the history of NHS policy-making has long been shaped by compromise and 
response to crisis. Reorganisation of regions within the NHS has tended to be pursued at 
ever-growing pace as the solution to the latest problems facing the health service. Once 
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again, there is an urgency to reforms currently taking place, without legislative change 
and subsequent conventional routines of scrutiny, reflection and political debate. Policy-
makers would be wise to not expect structural reorganisation to offer the ‘solution’ that 
resolves the remarkably complex challenges facing the co-ordination of health, and long-
standing challenges with social care. Yet nor does this provide sufficient justification to 
move onto the next structural reorganisation if expected outcomes are not achieved 
rapidly. 
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7. APPENDIX 
 
SEARCH STRATEGY 
 
DATABASE SEARCH TERMS 
Academics sources 
Pubmed ‘region’ OR ‘regional’ OR ‘regional governance’ OR ‘regional 
administration’ 
 
‘decentralisation’ OR ‘decentralization’ 
 
‘localism’ OR 
 
‘devolution’ OR 
 
‘meso’ OR 
 
‘intermediate’ OR 
 
‘sustainability and transformation plans’ OR ‘sustainability 
and transformation partnerships’ OR  
 
‘integrated care systems’ OR 
 
‘regional health authorities’ OR 
 
‘regional hospital boards’ OR 
 
‘regional offices’ OR 
 
‘strategic health authorities’ OR  
 
‘district health authorities’ OR 
 
‘area health authorities’ OR 
 
‘health authorities’ 
 
AND  
 
‘NHS’ OR ‘National Health Service’ 
Google Scholar 
Web of Science 
Grey sources 
NIHR As above 
Inclusion criteria 
Language English 
Published Any year 
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The National Health Service in England, 1974 
 
 
  
 
Corporate accountability 
Individual officer or joint 
team responsibility 
External relations 
Reproduction of Webster (1998: 108)  
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The National Health Service in England, 1982  
 
Modification of Harrison (1988: 23)  
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The National Health Service in England, 1997a 
  
Reproduction of Department of Health (1997), Departmental Report, Cm. 3612, annex E, The Stationary 
Office, London 
 
Health Authorities 
(100) 
Secretary of 
State for Health 
Department of 
Health 
Special Health 
Authorities (13) 
General Medical Practitioners 
(31,748) 
General Dental Practitioners 
(15,951) 
Pharmacies (9,787) 
Ophthalmic Contractors (6,778) 
NHS Trusts (429) 
GP Fundholders 
(13,423) 
NHS Executive 
(HQ) 
Regional Offices 
(8) 
Management 
Contracts 
Administration 
72 
 
The National Health Service, 1997b 
 
 
 
 
  
Modified from: Secretary of State for Health (1997) The New NHS. Modern. Dependable. Cm 3807, p.21. 
The Stationary Office, London 
 
Health Authorities 
(100) 
Secretary of 
State for Health 
Department of 
Health 
NHS Trusts 
100 Multifunds 
(2,600 GPs) 
NHS Executive 
(HQ) 
Regional Offices 
(8) 
Local Authorities 
Statutory 
accountability 
Service 
accountability 
Health 
improvement 
programme 
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The National Health Service, 2010 
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The National Health Service, 2013 (simplified)  
 
75 
 
8. REFERENCES 
Alderwick, H. and Ham, C. (2016) ‘NHS in England embraces collaboration in tackling 
biggest crisis in its history’, BMJ, 22(352:i1022). 
Allen, P. (2006) ‘New localism in the English National Health Service: What is it for?’, 
Health Policy, 79(2–3), pp. 244–252. doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2006.01.006. 
Ashburner, L., Ferlie, E. and Fitzgerald, L. (1996) ‘Organizational Transformation and 
Top-Down Change : The Case of the NHS’, 7, pp. 1–16. 
Atkinson, S. (2007) ‘Approaches to studying decentralization in health systems’, in 
Saltman, R. B., Bankauskaite, V., and Vrangbaek, K. (eds) Decentralization in 
Health Care. Maidenhead: Open University Press, pp. 87–104. 
Barlett, W. and Harrison, L. (1993) ‘Quasi-Markets and the National Health Service 
Reforms’, in Le Grand, J. and Barlett, W. (eds) Quasi-Markets and Social Policy. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 68–92. 
Bartlett, W. and Harrison, L. (1993) ‘Quasi-Markets and the National Health Service 
Reforms’, in Grand, J. Le and Bartlett, W. (eds) Quasi-Markets and Social Policy. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 68–92. doi: 10.1007/978-1-349-22873-7_4. 
Begley, P. and Sheard, S. (2019) ‘McKinsey and the “Tripartite Monster”: The Role of 
Management Consultants in the 1974 NHS Reorganisation’, Medical History: 
devoted to the history and bibliography of medicine and the related sciences, 63, 
pp. 390–410. doi: 10.1017/mdh.2019.41. 
Black, N. and Mays, N. (2016) ‘Sustainability and transformation plans: A troubled start’, 
BMJ (Online), 355(November), pp. 1–2. doi: 10.1136/bmj.i6064. 
Bossert, T. (1998) ‘Analyzing the decentralization of health systems in developing 
countries: decision space, innovation and performance’, Social science & 
medicine. Elsevier, 47(10), pp. 1513–1527. 
Brenner, N. (2009) ‘Open questions on state rescaling’, Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society, 2(1), pp. 123–139. doi: 10.1093/cjres/rsp002. 
Butler, J. (1992) Patients, Policies and Politics. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Charlesworth, J., Clarke, J. and Cochrane, A. (2006) ‘Managing Local Mixed Economies of 
Care’, Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space, 27(9), pp. 1419–1435. 
doi: 10.1068/a271419. 
Checkland, K. et al. (2016) ‘Complexity in the new NHS: longitudinal case studies of 
CCGs in England’, BMJ Open, 6(1), p. e010199. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2015-
010199. 
Checkland, K., Dam, R., et al. (2018) ‘Being Autonomous and Having Space in which to 
Act: Commissioning in the “New NHS” in England’, Journal of Social Policy, 47(2), 
pp. 377–395. doi: 10.1017/S0047279417000587. 
Checkland, K., Hammond, J., et al. (2018) ‘Understanding the new commissioning system 
in England: contexts, mechanisms and outcomes PR - R6 - 1113 - 25001’, (July). 
Checkland, K. et al. (2019) National evaluation of the Vanguard new care models 
programme. Interim report: understanding the national support programme. 
Manchester. 
76 
 
Cochrane, A. (1993) Whatever happened to local government? Open University Press. 
Cochrane, A. (2018) ‘Relational thinking and the region’, in Handbook on the 
Geographies of Regions and Territories. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Coleman, A. et al. (2010) ‘Local histories and local sensemaking: a case of policy 
implementation in the English National Health Service’, Policy and Politics, 38(2), 
p. 289. 
Coleman, A. et al. (2014) ‘Joining it up? Health and wellbeing boards in English local 
governance: evidence from clinical commissioning groups and shadow health 
and wellbeing boards’, Local Government Studies, 40(4), pp. 560–80. 
Coleman, A., Dhesi, S. and Peckham, S. (2016) ‘Health and Wellbeing Boards: The new 
System stewards’, in Exworthy, M., Mannion, R., and Powell, M. (eds) Dismantling 
the NHS? Evaluating the Impact of Health Reforms. Bristol: Polity Press, pp. 279–
300. 
Coultas, C., Kieslich, K. and Littlejohns, P. (2019) ‘Patient and public involvement in 
priority‐setting decisions in England’s Transforming NHS: An interview study 
with Clinical Commissioning Groups in South London sustainability 
transformation partnerships’, Health Expectations, (July), p. hex.12948. doi: 
10.1111/hex.12948. 
Cox, K. R. (2009) ‘“Rescaling the state” in question’, Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society, 2(1), pp. 107–121. doi: 10.1093/cjres/rsn029. 
Crisp, N. (2005) Commissioning a patient-led NHS, Department of Health. doi: 
10.12968/pnur.2005.16.10.19865. 
Davies, S. M. (2014) ‘Hierarchical regionalism and the rise of AHSNs’, British Journal of 
Healthcare Management, 18(11), pp. 581–585. doi: 
10.12968/bjhc.2012.18.11.581. 
Day, P. and Klein, R. (1997) Steering but not rowing? The transformation of the 
Department of Health: A case study. Bristol: The Policy Press. 
Department of Health (1989) ‘Caring for people: Community care in the next decade and 
beyond’, Cm. 849. hmso London. 
Department of Health (1993) Managing the new NHS: A background document. London. 
Department of Health (2010) Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS. London: The 
Stationery Office Limited on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office. 
Department of Health & Social Security (1983) First National Package of Performance 
Indicators for the NHS, Press Release no 83/181, 22 September. 
Dickinson, H. et al. (2013) ‘Joint commissioning in health and social care: An exploration 
of definitions, processes, services and outcomes’, p. 173. Available at: 
http://socialwelfare.bl.uk/subject-areas/services-activity/social-work-care-
services/nihrhealthservicesanddeliveryresearchprogramme/146551SDO_ES_08
-1806-260_V01.pdf. 
Dixon-woods, M. et al. (2004) Integrative approaches to qualitative and quantitative 
evidence, Health Development Agency. 
77 
 
Dopson, S. (1994) ‘A STUDY OF THE INTRODUCTION OF GENERAL MANAGEMENT 
MANAGING AMBIGUITY. IN THE NHS’, (October). 
Dopson, S., Locock, L. and Stewart, R. (1999) ‘Regional offices in the new NHS: An 
analysis of the effects and significance of recent changes’, Public Administration, 
77(1), pp. 91–110. doi: 10.1111/1467-9299.00145. 
Dopson, S. and Stewart, R. (1998) ‘The changing role of the regional tier of the NHS.’, 
Journal of management in medicine, 12(4–5), pp. 287–301, 197. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10351256. 
Edwards, N. (2010) ‘The triumph of hope over experience The voice of NHS leadership’. 
Elcock, H. (1978) ‘Regional Government in Action: The Members of Two Regional Health 
Authorities’, Public Administration, 56(4), pp. 379–397. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9299.1978.tb00337.x. 
Elkind, A. (1998) ‘Using metaphor to read the organisation of the NHS’, Social Science 
and Medicine, 47(11), pp. 1715–1727. doi: 10.1016/S0277-9536(98)00251-2. 
Exworthy, M. (1998) ‘Localism in the NHS quasi-market’, Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy, 16(4), pp. 449–462. doi: 10.1068/c160449. 
Exworthy, M. and Frosini, F. (2008) ‘Room for manoeuvre?. Explaining local autonomy 
in the English National Health Service’, Health Policy. Ireland, 86(2–3), pp. 204–
212. doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2007.10.008. 
Exworthy, M. and Peckham, S. (1998) ‘The contribution of coterminosity to joint 
purchasing in health and social care’, Health and Place, 4(3), pp. 233–243. doi: 
10.1016/S1353-8292(98)00018-5. 
Exworthy, M. and Powell, M. (2004) ‘Big windows and little windows: implementation 
in the “congested state”’, Public Administration. Wiley Online Library, 82(2), pp. 
263–281. 
Exworthy, M., Powell, M. and Mohan, J. (1999) ‘Markets, Bureaucracy and Public 
Management: The NHS: Quasi-market, Quasi-hierarchy and Quasi-network?’, 
Public Money & Management, 19(4), pp. 15–22. 
Ferlie, E. and Pettigrew, A. (1996) ‘The nature and transformation of corporate 
headquarters: a review of recent literature and a research agenda’, Journal of 
Management Studies, 33(4), pp. 495–523. 
Forder, J. et al. (2018) ‘A system-level evaluation of the Better Care Fund: Final Report’, 
(July). Available at: https://www.pssru.ac.uk/pub/5424.pdf. 
Glasby, J., Dickinson, H. and Miller, R. (2011) ‘Partnership working in England-where we 
are now and where we’ve come from.’, International journal of integrated care, 
11 Spec Ed(March), p. e002. doi: 10.5334/ijic.545. 
Glendinning, C. and Coleman, A. (2004) ‘Joint working: The health service agenda’, 
Partnerships Between Health and Local Government, 3930(2003), pp. 53–73. doi: 
10.4324/9780203508541. 
Goodwin, N. and Smith, J. (2011) ‘Developing a national strategy for the promotion of 
integrated care: The evidence base for integrated care’, The King’s Fund and 
Nuffield Trust. Available at: http://www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk/node/1662. 
78 
 
Gorsky, M. (2013) ‘“Searching for the people in charge”: Appraising the 1983 griffiths 
NHS management inquiry’, Medical History, 57(1), pp. 87–107. doi: 
10.1017/mdh.2012.82. 
Gray, M. and Barford, A. (2018) ‘The depths of the cuts: the uneven geography of local 
government austerity’. doi: 10.1093/cjres/rsy019. 
Greater Manchester Combined Authority (2015) ‘Greater Manchester Health and Social 
Care Devolution - Memorandum of Understanding’, pp. 1–15. 
Greener, I. et al. (2009) ‘Has labour decentralised the NHS? Terminological obfuscation 
and analytical confusion’, Policy Studies, 30(4), pp. 439–454. doi: 
10.1080/01442870902899905. 
Greengross, P., Grant, K. and Collini, E. (1999) ‘The History and Development of The UK 
National Health Service 1948 - 1999’, DFID Health Systems Resource Centre, pp. 
1–39. 
Griffiths, R. (1983) NHS management inquiry. London: Department of Health and Social 
Security. 
Guillebaud, C. W. (1956) Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Cost of the NHS. 
London. 
Ham, C. (1981) Policy-making in the National Health Service: A Case Study of the Leeds 
Regional Hospital Board. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. 
Ham, C. (1991) The new National Health Service : organization and management. Oxford: 
Radcliffe Medical Press. 
Ham, C. (1993) ‘The latest reorganisation ofthe NHS’, 307(October), pp. 8–9. 
Hammond, J. et al. (2017) ‘The spatial politics of place and health policy: Exploring 
Sustainability and Transformation Plans in the English NHS’, Social science & 
medicine (1982). England, 190, pp. 217–226. doi: 
10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.08.007. 
Hammond, J. et al. (2018) ‘Autonomy, accountability, and ambiguity in arm’s-length 
meta-governance: the case of NHS England’, Public Management Review. 
Routledge, 00(00), pp. 1–22. doi: 10.1080/14719037.2018.1544660. 
Harlock, J. et al. (2019) ‘Challenges in integrating health and social care : the Better Care 
Fund in England’. doi: 10.1177/1355819619869745. 
Harrison, S. (1988) Managing the National Health Service: shifting the frontier? London: 
Chapman and Hall. 
Heenan, D. and Birrell, D. (2006) ‘The integration of health and social care: The lessons 
from Northern Ireland’, Social Policy and Administration, 40(1), pp. 47–66. doi: 
10.1111/j.1467-9515.2006.00476.x. 
HM Government (1989) Working for patients. London. 
Hoggett, P. (1996) ‘New modes of control in the public service’, Public administration. 
Wiley Online Library, 74(1), pp. 9–32. 
House of Commons Health and Social Care Committee (2019) ‘NHS Long-term Plan: 
legislative proposals. Fifteenth Report of Session 2017–19’, (November), p. 71. 
Available at: 
79 
 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmhealth/963/963
.pdf. 
HSJ (2017) New care systems must be truly accountable. Available at: 
https://www.hsj.co.uk/7020576.article. 
HSJ (2018) Council quits leading ICS due to ‘lack of democratic oversight’. Available at: 
https://www.hsj.co.uk/policy-and-regulation/council-quits-leading-ics-due-to-
lack-of-democratic-oversight/7023962.article. 
HSJ (2019) MPs back most of NHS England’s proposed reforms, HSJ. Available at: 
https://www.hsj.co.uk/policy-and-regulation/mps-back-most-of-nhs-englands-
proposed-reforms/7025389.article. 
Hudson, B. (2011) ‘Ten years of jointly commissioning health and social care in 
England’, International Journal of Integrated Care, 11(5), pp. 1–9. doi: 
10.5334/ijic.553. 
Hughes, D. and Griffiths, L. (2010) ‘On Penalties and the Patient’s Charter: Centralism v 
De-Centralised Governance in the NHS’, Sociology of Health & Illness, 21(1), pp. 
71–94. doi: 10.1111/1467-9566.t01-1-00143. 
Humphries, R. (2015) ‘Integrated health and social care in England - Progress and 
prospects’, Health Policy. Elsevier Ireland Ltd, 119(7), pp. 856–859. doi: 
10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.04.010. 
Hunter, D. J. (1982) ‘Organising for Health: The National Health Service in the United 
Kingdom’, Journal of Public Policy, 2(3), pp. 263–300. doi: 
10.1017/S0143814X00001963. 
Jones, M. (2010) ‘Regionalism’, pp. 351–368. doi: 10.1002/9781444319071.ch18. 
Jones, M. (2019) Cities and Regions in Crisis The Political Economy of Subnational 
Economic Development. 
Jones, M. R. (1997) ‘Spatial selectivity of the state? The regulationist enigma and local 
struggles over economic governance’, Environment and Planning A, 29(5), pp. 
831–864. doi: 10.1068/a290831. 
Joyce, P. (2001) ‘Governmentality and risk : setting priorities in the new NHS’, Sociology 
of Health and Illness, 23(5), pp. 594–614. doi: 10.1111/1467-9566.00267. 
Judge, K. and Mays, N. (1994) ‘Equity in the NHS Allocating resources for health and 
social care in England’, Bmj, 308(6940), p. 1363. doi: 
10.1136/bmj.308.6940.1363. 
Keating, M. (2017) ‘Contesting European regions’, Regional Studies. Taylor & Francis, 
51(1), pp. 9–18. doi: 10.1080/00343404.2016.1227777. 
Kewell, B., Hawkins, C. and Ferlie, E. (2002) ‘From “market umpires” to “relationship 
managers”?: The future of the NHS regional offices in a time of transition’, Public 
Management Review, 4(1), pp. 3–22. doi: 10.1080/14616670110101663. 
Klein, R. (2010) The New Politics of the NHS: From creation to reinvention. Sixth Edit. 
Oxford and New York: Radcliffe Publishing. 
Levitt, R., Wall, A. and Appleby, J. (1999) The Reorganized National Health Service. Sixth 
Edit. Cheltenham: Stanley Thornes. 
80 
 
Lindblom, C. E. (1968) The Policy-Making Process. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
Local Government Association (2019) What a difference a place makes: The growing 
impact of health and wellbeing boards. London: Local Government Association. 
Locock, L. and Dopson, S. (2007) ‘The Three In One and One In Three’, Public 
Management: An International Journal of Research and Theory, 1(1), pp. 27–47. 
doi: 10.1080/14719037800000003. 
Lorne, C. et al. (2019) ‘Regional assemblage and the spatial reorganisation of health and 
care: the case of devolution in Greater Manchester, England’, Sociology of Health 
& Illness, xx(xx), pp. 1–15. doi: 10.1111/1467-9566.12867. 
MacKinnon, D. (2015) ‘Devolution , State Restructuring and Policy Divergence in the 
United Kingdom’, Geographical Journal, 181(1), pp. 47–56. 
McDermott, I. et al. (2018) ‘Understanding Primary Care Co-Commissioning: Uptake, 
Development, and Impacts. Final Report.’, (March), pp. 1–127. 
Medicaj, B. (1975) ‘Modifying the reorganisation of the NHS’, British Medical Journal, 
4(5989), pp. 183–184. doi: 10.1136/bmj.4.5989.183. 
Medical Services Review Committee (1962) A Review of Medical Services in Great Britain. 
London. doi: 10.1136/bmj.2.5313.1171. 
Mohan, J. (1995) A National Health Service? The restructuring of health care in Britain 
since 1979. London: Macmillan. 
Mohan, J. (2002) Planning, markets and hospitals. London: Routledge. 
Moon, G. and Brown, T. (2000) ‘Governmentality and the spatialized discourse of policy: 
The consolidation of the post-1989 NHS reforms’, Transactions of the Institute of 
British Geographers. Wiley/Blackwell (10.1111), 25(1), pp. 65–76. doi: 
10.1111/j.0020-2754.2000.00065.x. 
Moran, V., Allen, P. and Mcdermott, I. (2018) ‘Investigating recent developments in the 
commissioning system Final Report’, (September), pp. 1–92. Available at: 
http://blogs.lshtm.ac.uk/prucomm/files/2018/11/Recent-developments-in-
commissioning-report_FINAL-as-submitted-sept-18.pdf. 
National Health Service Act (1946) National Health Services Act, 1946. Available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1946/81/pdfs/ukpga_19460081_en.pdf. 
National Health Service Reorganisation Act 1973 (1973) National Health Service 
Reorganisation Act 1973. 
Newman, J. (2001) Modernizing Governance: New Labour, Policy and Society. London: 
Sage. 
NHS (2014) Five Year Forward View. London: NHS. 
NHS (2015) ‘Delivering the Forward View: NHS planning guidance 2016/17 – 2020/21’, 
(December 2015). Available at: https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/planning-guid-16-17-20-21.pdf. 
NHS (2017) Next Steps on the NHS five year forward view. Available at: 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/publication/next-steps-on-the-nhs-five-year-
forward-view/. 
81 
 
NHS (2019a) ’ ‘The NHS long term plan’. London: NHS. doi: 10.1136/bmj.l84. 
NHS (2019b) ‘Designing integrated care systems ( ICSs ) in England’, (June). 
NHS England (2015) Delegated commissioning of primary medical services. Available at: 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/commissioning/wp-
content/uploads/sites/12/2015/10/co-commissioning-update-letter.pdf. 
NHS England (2016) Sustainability and Transformation Plan Footprints [online]. 
Available at: https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/stp-
footprints- march-2016.pdf (Accessed: 12 June 2017). 
NHS England (2018a) Draft ICP Contract: a Consultation. 
NHS England (2018b) NHS England and NHS Improvement announce new senior 
leadership posts. Available at: https://www.england.nhs.uk/2018/12/nhs-
england-and-nhs-improvement-announce-new-senior-leadership-posts/. 
NHS England (2019a) NHS England regional teams. Available at: 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/about/regional-area-teams/ (Accessed: 1 October 
2019). 
NHS England (2019b) Primary care networks. Available at: 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/primary-care/primary-care-networks/. 
NHS England (no date) About Primary Care Co-commissioning. Available at: 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/commissioning/pc-co-comms/pc-comms/. 
NHS Executive (1994) Managing the new NHS: functions and responsibilities in the new 
NHS. London: Department of Health. 
Office of Health Economics (1977) The reorganised NHS. London: Office of Health 
Economics. 
Osipovic, D. et al. (2019) ‘The regulation of competition and procurement in the 
National Health Service 2015-2018: enduring hier- archical control and the 
limits of juridification’, Health Economics, Policy and Law. doi: 
10.1016/j.inhe.2011.10.001.Cost-effectiveness. 
OsipoviČ, D. et al. (2016) ‘Interrogating Institutional Change: Actors’ Attitudes To 
Competition and Cooperation in Commissioning Health Services in England’, 
Public Administration, 94(3), pp. 823–838. doi: 10.1111/padm.12268. 
Paasi, A. (1986) ‘The Institutionalization of Regions: A Theoretical Framework for 
Under- standing the Emergence of Regions and Regional Identity’, Fennia, 164, 
pp. 105–146. 
Paasi, A. (2000) ‘Re-constructing regions and regional identity’, Katholieker Universiteit 
Nijmegen, Nethur Lecture, July, pp. 1–9. Available at: 
http://gpm.ruhosting.nl/avh/Paasi1.pdf. 
Paton, C. (1999) ‘New Labour’s Health Policy’, in Powell, M. (ed.) New Labour, New 
Welfare State. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Peck, J. (2001) ‘Neoliberalizing states : thin policies / hard outcomes’, Progress in 
Human Geography, 25(3), pp. 445–455. doi: 10.1191/030913201680191772. 
Peckham, S. et al. (2005) ‘Decentralisation , Centralisation and Devolution in publicly 
funded health services : decentralisation as an organisational model for health 
82 
 
care in England’, National Co-ordinating Centre for NHS Service Delivery and 
Organisation. 
Peckham, S. (2016) ‘Decentralisation - A Portmanteau Concept That Promises Much but 
Fails to Deliver? Comment on “Decentralisation of Health Services in Fĳi: A 
Decision Space Analysis”’, International journal of health policy and management, 
5(12), pp. 729–732. doi: 10.15171/ijhpm.2016.88. 
Pickard, S. (1997) ‘The future organization of community health councils’, Social Policy 
and Administration, 31(3), pp. 274–289. doi: 10.1111/1467-9515.00056. 
Pope, C., Mays, N. and Popay, J. (2007) Synthesising qualitative and quantitative health 
evidence: A guide to methods: A guide to methods. McGraw-Hill Education (UK). 
Powell, M. (1998) ‘In what sense a National Health Service?’, Public Policy and 
Administration, 13(3), pp. 56–69. doi: 10.1177/095207679801300305. 
Powell, M. (2018) ‘Exploring 70 Years of the British National Health Service through 
Anniversary Documents’, International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 
7(7), pp. 574–580. doi: 10.15171/ijhpm.2018.21. 
Public Administration (1949) ‘The Hospital Service: A report on recent developments’, 
Public Administration, (March), pp. 39–50. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9299.1951.tb01387.x. 
Pulse (2011) PCTs to survive as ‘outposts’ of new commissioning board, Pulse. Available 
at: http://www.pulsetoday.co.uk/pcts-to-survive-as-outposts-of-new-
commissioning-board/12211629.article. 
Rhodes, R. (1988) Beyond Westminster and Whitehall The Sub-Central Governments of 
Britain. London: Unwin Hyman Ltd. 
Rivett, G. (1996) From Cradle to Grave: Fifty years of the NHS. London: King’s Fund. 
Robinson, R. and Le Grand, J. (1994) Evaluating the national health service reforms. 
Transaction Publishers. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Gill, N. (2003) ‘The global trend towards devolution and its 
implications’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy. SAGE 
Publications Sage UK: London, England, 21(3), pp. 333–351. doi: 10.1068/c0235. 
Rondinelli, D. A. (1981) ‘Government decentralization in comparative perspective: 
theory and practice in developing countries’, International review of 
administrative sciences. Sage Publications Sage CA: Thousand Oaks, CA, 47(2), pp. 
133–145. 
Sanderson, M., Allen, P. and Osipovic, D. (2017) ‘The regulation of competition in the 
National Health Service (NHS): what difference has the Health and Social Care 
Act 2012 made?’, Health Economics, Policy and Law, 12(1), pp. 1–19. doi: 
10.1017/s1744133116000116. 
Seebohm, F. (1968) ‘The Seebohm Report’, Reports of the Committee on Local Authority 
and Allied Personal Social Services. 
Shifting the Balance of Power within the NHS (2001) Shifting the Balance of Power 
within the NHS: Securing Delivery, Department of Health. London: Department of 
Health. 
83 
 
Smith, N., Mitton, C. and Davidson, A. (2014) ‘A politics of priority setting : Ideas , 
interests and institutions in healthcare resource allocation’. doi: 
10.1177/0952076714529141. 
Storey, J. et al. (2010) ‘The intended and unintended outcomes of new governance 
arrangements within the NHS’, pp. 1–7. 
Storey, J. (2011) ‘Steering whilst rowing: governing and managing health services from 
the centre’, Journal of Health Organization and Management, 25(6), pp. 625–644. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/MRR-09-2015-0216. 
Sum, N.-L. and Jessop, B. (2013) Towards a cultural political economy: Putting culture in 
its place in political economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Tallis, P. (1981) Planning in the National Health Service. Manchester: Department of 
Social Administration. Health Services Management Unit. University of 
Manchester. 
The Lancet (1950) ‘The Hospital Service Plan’, The Lancet. doi: 10.1016/s0140-
6736(54)91385-9. 
The National Archives (1947) MH 90/1 J. E. Pater to J. P. Wetenhall, 26 February 1947. 
The new NHS. Modern. Dependable. (1997) The new NHS. Modern. Dependable. London: 
Department of Health. 
Thorlby, R. et al. (2014) ‘The Francis report: A year on’, The Lancet, 383(9917), p. 576. 
doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(14)60204-X. 
Thrift, N. (1994) ‘Taking Aim at the Heart of the Region’, in Gregory, D., Martin, R., and 
Smith, G. (eds) Human Geography: Society, Space and Social Science. London: 
Macmillan, pp. 200–231. doi: 10.1007/978-1-349-23638-1_8. 
Timmins, N. (2018) ‘“ The World ” s Biggest Quango ’ The First Five Years of NHS 
England’. 
De Vries, M. S. (2000) ‘The rise and fall of decentralization: A comparative analysis of 
arguments and practices in European countries’, European Journal of Political 
Research, 38, pp. 193–224. 
Wainwright, D. and Calnan, M. (2011) ‘What the doctor ordered: the Audit Commission’s 
case study of general practice fundholders’, in Exworthy, M. et al. (eds) Shaping 
Health Policy: Case study methods and analysis. Bristol: Policy Press. 
Walshe, K. (2017) ‘Sustainability and transformation plans for the NHS in England: 
Radical or wishful thinking?: Greater commitment from the government is vital’, 
BMJ (Online), 356, pp. 1–2. doi: 10.1136/bmj.j1043. 
Walshe, K. et al. (2018) Devolving health and social care : learning from Greater 
Manchester. 
Warden, J. (1993) ‘New High Command for the NHS’, 307(October), p. 1091. 
Webster, C. (1998a) ‘National Health Service Reorganisation: Learning from History?’, 
44(0), pp. 1–25. Available at: 
http://www.opengrey.eu/item/display/10068/377601. 
Webster, C. (1998b) The National Health Servce: A Political History. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
84 
 
Wistow, G. (2012) ‘Still a fine mess? Local government and the NHS 1962 to 2012’, 
Journal of Integrated Care, 20(2), pp. 101–114. doi: 
10.1108/14769011211220517. 
 
 
